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ABSTRACT
v A management information system for use m the 1 Production Department
of a Naval Shipyard has been developed using the model-based decision-
oriented systems design approach of Rockart, Gerrity and others. The
Boston Naval Shipyard, Charlestown, Massachusetts, was used for the descrip-
tive model. Where possible, the existing standard shipyard MIS was retained
and included in the design.
^The management information system design process has been broken down
into three discrete segments:
"'a. Systems analysis— construction of normative and descriptive
models
.
v b. Determination of system requirements --comparison of the
normative and descriptive models to determine system requirements.
s/c. System development- -development of a system to accomplish
the requirements developed above
.J
After a brief shipyard orientation period, construction of the norma-
tive model was begun. For the descriptive model, three levels of management
within the Production Department of the Boston Naval Shipyard were observed:
foremen (first-line supervisors), the Repair Officer, and the Production Of-
ficer (department head). The observation period consisted of approximately
one and a half months of close, daily contact with the managers involved.
The decisions of these managers and information relating to them were re-
corded and later analyzed and categorized. After comparison of the norma-
tive and descriptive models to determine the information system require-
ments to support the decision categories for the managers, an MIS was
designed to satisfy these requirements.
The authors have demonstrated the usefulness of the model-based, de-
cision-oriented approach applied to the shipyard job shop environment, have
proposed significant changes to the system currently in use in the naval
shipyards, and recommend that potential application areas for the model-
based, decision-oriented approach (i.e., other than job shop) be investi-
gated.
Thesis Supervisor: John F. Rockart




The authors are indebted to several people for the many hours they
devoted to this project. We are grateful to Mr. Edward T. Antkowiak
,
Technical Director, CASDO, for the long afternoon discussions during which
he helped develop our background knowledge and define the scope of our ef-
forts. We appreciate the efforts of Mr. Charles R. McKenzie , who served
as our "guide" and "door opener" in the shipyard and to the shipyard em-
ployees. He also provided a perspective of 34 years in the shipyard that
was very useful. The patience of the managers we studied at Boston Naval
Shipyard is also appreciated—John Ryan, Shop 38, Foreman Machinist (Marine)
George E. Varnum, Shop 51, Foreman Electrician, Anthony J. Giuffre , Shop 56,
Foreman Pipefitter, Joseph J. Pasakarnis , Shop 67, Foreman Electronics Me-
chanic, CDR Anthony Tortora, USN, Repair Officer, and CAPT William J.
Morris, USN, Production Officer.
We are especially appreciative for the advice and direction provided
by Professor Jack F. Rockart. We also are grateful to Professor Malcom M.
Jones
.
We acknowledge Mrs. Jack ("Sam") Price for her many talents, most










A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
B. SCOPE
C. METHOD
CHAPTER II: METHOD OF DESIGN
A. GENERAL
B. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DESIGN
1. TYPES OF APPROACH






































2. METHODS CONSIDERED 36
3. SELECTION 38
E.> DATA REDUCTION AND ANALYSIS 39
CHAPTER III: THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD--BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 45
A. GENERAL 45
B. MISSION AND CAPABILITY 45
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 47
D. SHIPYARD INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS 50
1. ADVANCE PLANNING 5 3
2. SHORT-RANGE PLANNING 54
3. OVERHAUL AVAILABILITY 55
E. FINANCIAL MECHANISMS 55
F. IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 56
G. CURRENT SHIPYARD MIS 58
CHAPTER IV: MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE SHIPYARD 64
A. GENERAL 64
B. THE NORMATIVE MODEL OF THE PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT 64
1. BACKGROUND 64
2. THE SHIPYARD AS A JOB SHOP ACTIVITY 65
3. OTHER ASPECTS 72
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECISION PROCESS 74
C. THE DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF THE PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT 78
D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 124







B. THE OVERALL SYSTEM
v/1. THE CONTROL SYSTEM
2. PRIORITY/DISPATCHING
3. COMMUNICATIONS
4. ADVANCE PLANNING/WORK LOAD FORECASTING
5. METHODS AND STANDARDS
6. PLANT FACILITIES
C. SUPPORT FOR EACH MANAGER STUDIED
1. THE FOREMAN
2. THE REPAIR OFFICER





















II-l INFORMATION SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS 16 ^
II-2 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 18 •/
II-3 MODEL-BASED SYSTEM ANALYSIS 23
I 1-4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 26
II-5 MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN THE SHIPYARD 33
II-6 DATA SHEET 40
III-l SHIPYARD ORGANIZATION CHART 48
III-2 PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 49
I I I-
3
THE PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT 51
III-4 PLANNING DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION 52
IV-1 MAJOR DECISION ANALYSIS: FOREMAN 87
IV-2 DECISION FLOW DIAGRAM: FOREMAN 88
IV-3 INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAM: FOREMAN 89 v
IV-4 INFORMATION SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING: FOREMAN 90 v
IV-5 MAJOR DECISION ANALYSIS: REPAIR OFFICER 99 "
IV-6 DECISION FLOW DIAGRAM: REPAIR OFFICER 100 v
IV-7 INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAM: REPAIR OFFICER 101 v
IV-8 INFORMATION SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING: REPAIR OFFICER 102
IV-9 MAJOR DECISION ANALYSIS: PRODUCTION OFFICER 109 "
IV- 10 DECISION FLOW DIAGRAM: PRODUCTION OFFICER 110 J
IV-11 INFORMATION FLOW DIAGRAM: PRODUCTION OFFICER 111





V-l FOREMAN STATUS REPORT 1^6
V-2 MILESTONE SCHEDULE 150
V-3 PROJECT STATUS INDICATOR SUMMARY 152
V-4 SHOP WORK STATUS REPORT 15 3
V-5 OVERTIME STATUS REPORT 154
V-6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SUMMARY REPORT 156





A. Statement of the Problem
The method utilized in the design of a management information system
will certainly affect the delivered product and therefore the effectiveness
of the operational system to aid and improve the management process. In
practice, design methods in the past have ranged from the mere bottom-up
conversion of existing manual data storage systems into computer data
storage systems, to detailed, expensive and lengthy systems analysis design
efforts. There is abundant literature which describes the methods utilized
by past and current designers, and additionally provides historical examples
and critiques of specific system designs.
It would be a harsh judgement to render that the current state-of-the-
art in management information system design is inadequate and that manage-
ment information systems are therefore ineffective. However, it is reason-
able to state that management information systems have not proven to be as
helpful to managers as systems designers in the past have heralded they
1
would be. In the vivid description by Zani
:
"Traditionally, management information systems have not really
been designed at all. They have been spun off as by-products of
the process of automating or improving existing systems within a
company.
When a company's information system comes into existence in this
second-hand manner, it is largely fortuitous whether the informa-
tion the system provides is exactly the sort of information the
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managers in the company need to help them make their decisions.
If it does turn out to be exactly what they need, then, well and
good. If it does not--and this is much more likely to be the
case--then clearly the so-called 'management information system'
is merely a mechanism for 1 cluttering managers' desks with costly,
voluminous, and probably irrelevant printouts." (Underlining ours.)
Several authors have contributed ideas in an effort to develop a
more rational and effective approach to management information systems




"For nearly two decades, the above tools and techniques have been
used to answer the question 'How does one go about the process of
information systems analysis?' Their weakness, however, is that
the significant questions in the systems study field are not be-
gun with the interrogative 'how' but rather with 'what.' The
truly serious questions for the systems analyst are 'What should
I look at?' and 'What is the best approach to understanding this
system? '
"
The answer to the second of the latter two queries is proposed by
Rockart to be a model-based systems analysis:
"The analyst who has a clear model of the area he is researching
3
will do a faster and more effective job of systems analysis."
It is herein hypothesized that the answer to the first query should
be that the "what" to be looked at is the decision process of the organi-
zation and of each manager in the organization. The rationale for this
4
stems from the view of ^ani that:
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"Rather than mirroring existing procedures, ... an information
system should be designed to focus on the critical tasks and de-
cisions made within an organization and made to provide the kind
of information that the manager needs to perform those tasks and
make those decisions."
There are several potential advantages to this model-based, decision
oriented approach to MIS design. It will assure that all important areas
of the organization are examined and that deficiencies in the existing
system are improved. If the design is done properly, it will also pro-
vide for future adjustments as the basic processes are improved. The
resulting system will be one tailored to the organization and to the in-
dividuals in it, and will be capable of change as the key personnel
change. It will reflect the goals and objectives of top management and
will be purposefully constructed in a combination top-down and bottom-up
manner vice the exclusive bottom-up manner typical in the past. It will
influence decision making in the critical areas determined by top manage-
ment and will thus "focus information technology and resources where they
5
do the most good."
B. Scope
The task of designing a model"based, decision- oriented information
system for the total management of a naval shipyard is obviously one of
very large proportions. There are ten operational naval shipyards in
this Country employing approximately 50,000 people. Each shipyard has
an annual business of almost 100 million dollars, and issues 400,000 de-
sign drawings and 700,000 individual job instructions yearly. Tn
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addition, it maintains a material inventory of 121 million dollars with
total annual value of transactions of almost 300 million dollars. This
is comprised of 100,000 receipt transactions and 550,000 expenditure
transactions. The nation's' naval shipyards currently employ a standard
MIS largely developed in the 1960 's, and although currently in use, it
is still an evolving management tool whose creation and implementation
has already consumed tens of thousands of man days.
Thus , in our efforts to shed light on the systems design of a decision-
oriented information system, we of necessity had to limit the scope of the
problem to a manageable level; i.e., the project had to be of such magni-
tude that the supporting literature search, field observations, analysis,
evaluation, system design and presentation could be adequately performed
by two persons in a three- to four-month time frame.
With this in mind and taking into consideration the probable areas
of endeavor in which we might find ourselves several years hence, our
interest was focused on the "Production Department" of the Boston Naval
Shipyard. (See Chapter III for a complete description of the mission,
organizational structure, etc., of a naval shipyard.) Concisely stated,
it is the task of the Production Department to execute in a timely fashion
and within available funding, all approved ship and productive non-ship
support work in connection with ship maintenance, overhaul and construc-
tion. There are approximately 3100 persons in the department to accom-
plish this task. Realizing also that thoroughness should take precedence
over the alternative of a broad sample (at least for the purposes of this
thesis), the study was confined to three levels of management within the
Production Department: the Foreman, the Repair Officer, and the. Production
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Officer (the reader is again referred to Chapter III for more descriptive
information). This selection had the added benefit of providing observa-
tions of management ranging from the first-line supervisor (Foreman) to
the department head (Production Officer), as well as insight into inter-
actions between low and high level management within the department.
C. Method
The most influential sources in the development of the method were
7 g 9 10
the works of Rock art, Gerrity, Mintzberg, and Zani. The exact method
employed is described in detail in Chapter II. Briefly, the model-based
systems analysis of Rockart and Gerrity was first used to obtain a "norm-
ative" model of the level of management under consideration. Here the
word normative is used to denote a model based on what the writers thought
was the ideal prior to observation of the individual. This model concen-
trated on determining the decision areas in which production department
managers should be involved. Each of four foremen was observed for a
period of one week
,
as were both the Repair Officer and the Production Of-
ficer. Information from the observations was recorded on a form which,
though not directly related to any used by Mintzberg, was influenced by
his extensive coverage of the data gathering process.
This data was categorized using the approach suggested by Zani and
Rockart, and a descriptive model was formulated. From the normative and
descriptive models, a decision-oriented information system to support the
three levels of management observed was constructed. The reader will note
that we did not intend to formulate the entire information system, but
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The process of designing an information system can be viewed as con-
sisting of three basic steps—system analysis, system development, and
programming. It is necessary to state our definitions of the above terms
because there does not appear to be a general agreement in the literature.
Design is the entire process utilized in converting from a manual
system to an operating man-machine system. It encompasses all three of
the basic steps. System analysis is the process of determining the re-
quirements of the system being designed. System development is the process
of determining and planning how the system will be implemented./ It in-
eludes determining what the required inputs are to obtain the outputs de-
sired, and determining the type and size of the hardware to be utilized.
] Programming is the implementation of the system. J)
The reader should take note that our use of the word design is dif-
ferent than that found in some of the literature. Frequently, the word
design is used to describe both the overall process and the system develop-
ment phase. Our definitions were arbitrarily selected, but are stated
here in an effort to avoid confusion on the part of the reader.
\^It must be realized that there is definite overlap between the three
basic steps
,
and that a more optimal system will result if the design path
allows for iteration. These relations are illustrated in Figure II-l.
J
This paper is concerned only with the first two steps. It is centered
on the process of developing the system requirements and the system
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specifications with regard to information. It does not consider the hard-
ware inplications , and the process of hardware selection. The authors do
not intend for the reader to infer that hardware selection is not impor-
tant. Rather, we feel that at the present time, the full utilization of
existing hardware has not been realized, and the pursuit of finding ways
to accomplish effective utilization is the more interesting problem.
B. Alternative Methods of Design
The need for development of a rational and effective approach to MIS
design was described in Chapter I. The model-based, decision-oriented
system design which is proposed as the method that will achieve the de-
sired effectiveness is not the only approach available. In this section,
a description and evaluation of the alternatives which are available is
presented. The alternatives are a composite of the methods utilized in
the past and of recent proposals by writers in the field of information
technology.
Our approach is to take the statement by Rock art that, "The truly
serious questions for the systems analyst are 'What should I look at?'
and 'What is the best approach to understanding this system?'" and at-
tempt to answer the two queries. At the current time, the second seems
to have only a limited range of possible answers—specifically, conven-
tional systems analysis or model-based systems analysis. A search for
the answer to the first question offers a wider range of possibilities.
We have chosen to call the answers to "What should I look at?" the possi-
ble "orientations" of the design process. The spectrum includes decision,
information flow, machine, process
,
data and functional orientations.
























discussed in detail below. We feel that all the reasonable alternatives
available probably have not been considered, and hope that the imaginative
reader will attempt to expand the matrix in both dimensions in an effort
to further shed light on the design cf management information systems
.
1. Types cf Approach
a. Conventional Systems Analysis
Conventional systems analysis as applied to information sys-
tems design is described by many authors, some of whose writings are dis-
cussed below.
Withington's first step in his very general "systems study" is ori-
ented toward the determination of the "... functions and decisions re-
quired of management at the various levels in the organization." This is
followed by a "pinpointing" of the information required to perform the
work and make the decisions. The information is appropriately displayed
by means of a flow or system chart, and after a clear understanding cf
the organization's information system needs, alternative mechanisms to
2
supply these needs are devised.
The procedure used by Gregory and Van Home is more explicit:
"There are five steps the systems analyst must perform:
"First , obtain facts by interviewing and observing activities
about the events--their type, volume and timing--that lead to the
origination of documents , maintenance of files , issuance of re-
ports
,
processing steps done at each work station, and flow of
documents between stations.
"Second
, collect sample copies of filled-in documents, file






study processing operations to learn the 'hov;' and 'why'
of every document that each person receives or issues, what proces-
sing steps he performs, the nature of files he keeps or uses,
and the contents of any reports he prepares.
" Fourth
,
organize the facts obtained into flow charts , flow
lists or other suitable form to trace the path of data from
origin through each stage of communication and processing into
files, and out of files to reports.
"Fifth , interview each user of documents and reports to learn
„3
what information he uses in his work and what he thinks he needs
Glans , et al, divide the analysis into two steps:
"Understanding the Present System
In order to understand the present system, analysts try to
determine what is done in the organization, using what inputs,
with what resources, to achieve what results.
" Determining System Requirements
In determining the requirements of a system, two main questions
arise: (1) What is the system required to do, now and in the
future? (2) How well must it perform to fulfill these require-
ments? . . . Collection and review of information constitute the
... 4first steps in determining the requirements of the system."
Thus it is seen that ! conventional systems analysis provides the
designer with a descriptive model of the current system and a determina-
tion of system requirements . \
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b. Model-based Systems Analysis
The concept of model-based systems analysis was first explicitly
5 5
stated by Rockart in 1970 and elaborated upon that same year by Gerrity.^
7
The foundation of their thesis can be located in the works of Nadler,
8 9
Carroll, and Pounds.
The significant contribution of the model-based approach is the require-
ment that the analyst formulate a normative model of the system to be studied
prior to development of the detailed descriptive model of the system. The
purpose of having a normative model is to guide the analyst to the important
areas and to give him a benchmark for comparison with the descriptive model.
This comparison is used to generate alternatives and then system require-
ments, as well as pinpoint the current system flaws.
Gerrity -describes the major function of the normative model in the fol-
lowing manner
:
"Construction of or search for normative models is aimed at uncover-
ing desirable standards for comparison with the current system. It
involves the specification of characteristics and behaviour of an
ideal system. These characteristics may be derived from a number of
sources: direct elaboration of system goals, search of the litera-




in the system, etc.
In order to obtain a realistic normative model that will be applicable,
a certain amount of descriptive modeling must be accomplished along with the
development of the normative model. The implication of this is that the
process is an iterative one. This iterative nature cannot be over

-22-
emphasized, especially where the analyst is involved in newer application
areas. The intended framework is displayed in Figure II-3.
c . Evaluation of Approaches
The conventional analysis approach to problems possesses several ad-
vances over previously used methods. The basic technique is relatively
formal, applicable to a wide variety of situations and capable of being
learned without excessive effort. Although there is no standard guidance
on how to generate alternatives, emphasis is placed on their generation,
display, evaluation and relative ranking. Perhaps the greatest advantage
of systems analysis over earlier methods is the communications improvement
which it provides. Systems analysts "talk the same language;" different
groups working on related problems can relatively easily comprehend the
status of work in progress, compare alternatives, and the like.
Model-based systems analysis possesses not only the advantages of the
conventional approach, but goes beyond. By comparing the descriptive and
normative models, the analyst should be more rapid, effective, and effi-
cient in defining problem areas. As Rockart states:
"Where the study is merely seen as 'finding out how the current
system can best be computerized' (i.e. conventional systems analy-
sis) important dimensions of the process can be overlooked.
Model-based, problem finding, systems analysis assists in ensuring
(1) that no important areas of the system are overlooked, (2) that
deficiencies in the current process are identified and improved,
and (3) that the information system is designed to be able to ad-
just to and take advantage of improvements in the basic process
11



















Frcm this Poundsian problem-finding approach, initial specifications
are developed in response to "gaps" identified in the comparison of the
normative and descriptive models. If the normative model is constructed
before the bulk of the descriptive model, it is also quite possible that
the final design may tend to be more creative and less susceptible to sub-
optimal, incremental improvements of the current system. The modeler may
thus focus on "what should be" rather than "what is" and the normative
model may extend the designers' planning horizon by becoming a long run
standard. However, the danger exists that the normative model may be de-
veloped with too much insulation from the real situation and prove to be
naive or infeasible. Gerrity points out that:
"In the extreme . . . normative modeling cannot begin without some
minimal notion of the descriptive structure and goals of the real
process. Hence descriptive and normative modeling must be paral-
. . . 12lei activities to some extent.
There can be a non-simple relationship between the normative and de-
scriptive models. The descriptive model may suggest human, economic or
technological constraints on the feasibility of the normative model. In
severe cases, it may even suggest omissions to the normative model.
It appears that the model-based approach is more readily adaptable
to Anthony's "strategic planning, management control, and operational
13
control" framework, whereas conventional systems analysis seems well
suited only to operational control problems. Its tendency to focus on
structured day-to-day activities and relationships in the formulation of
the descriptive model, and its frequent only step improvement over the
current system renders conventional systems analysis less appropriate for

-25-
management control and strategic planning problems. The model-based ap-
proach tends to give the analyst a more global view, and its emphasis on
goals/objectives, primary functions, and ideal relationships appears to be
more appropriate for the whole spectrum of Anthony's framework.
These same qualities of the model-based approach also make it more
14
appropriate for application to the Gorry-Scott Morton framework for
management information systems, specifically in the areas of semi-
structured and unstructured problems. As these two authors point out,
most efforts in the past have focused on the upper left-hand corner of
their nine-celled matrix (see Figure II-4). To relieve this imbalance,
future applications will be not only in the areas of management control
and strategic planning, but also toward the solution of unstructured prob-
lems. It is our belief that the model-based systems analysis approach is
a viable method by which progress in these areas will be obtained.
2. Orientations— "What to look at"
A review of previously-utilized orientations includes:
a. Information Flow
The primary objective of a system which concentrates on ana-
lyzing information flows will be to improve the efficiency of the current
system. This approach may be applicable where there already exists a ma-
chine-based system which is in need of improvement, but which already has
the basic elements contained in the appropriate normative model and per-
forms the functions desired by management, but not as well as desired. It
can be expected to provide only incremental improvements. Selection of
this method must be preceeded by the determination that efficiency is what
is needed. Concentrating on information flows will not lead the analyst
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to ask, "What is this information for?" and "Is it really needed?" The
danger is that you will produce an efficient but ineffective system.
b . Machine Centered
The machine-centered design concept is similar to the informa-
tion flow method in that both are concerned with efficiency. In this case,
15it is "hardware system efficiency, thruput, and capacity utilization."
This approach has its advantages in large data storage-retrieval systems
where there is little or no "data processing." It is not appropriate for
the type of information system which is intended to aid the manager to im-
prove the management processes. Hardware costs are decreasing relative to
the human costs in systems development and operation, and this trend is ex-
pected to continue. The price paid for a machine-centered design is a sys-
tem relatively insensitive to user needs and problems. From the few experi-
ences we have had, and from cases we have studied, the most certain way to
make a MIS ineffective and unused is to insulate it from the user in that
manner. The result is an undesirable escalation in the cost benefit ratio.
c. Process Centered
A process-centered orientation is "characterized by a factor-
ing of an existing process into small modules ... (and) no real thought is
i f\
given to overall redesign." This may result in incremental improvements
in efficiency, but is seen to be little more than a conversion of a manual
process into a machine process. It has already been noted in Chapter I that
this has resulted in sub-optimal systems.
d. Data Centered
The data-centered orientation is well described by Gerrity:
"The philosophy of this approach is often called 'total systems.'
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It manifests itself in the design of systems from the bottom up,
starting with the data base. The notion seems to be that if one
starts with all of the operational control data in an organiza-
tion and builds up from' there, then one will eventually arrive at
the integrated system which will serve xhe decision needs of all,
including top managers.... The design is driven by the availabil-
ity of a large machine -readable data base, rather than by carefully
17
defined problem-oriented requirements."
This orientation has some advantages. The large data base can allow
for flexible and easily changeable outputs as needs, situations, and person-
nel change. There is the base data which can be aggregated properly for use
at higher levels of management. There are also problems with this orienta-
tion. Too much emphasis is placed on data and not enough on output and the
system. Managers at all levels are left to determine their own needs with-
out any overall coordination. The large data base may require undue invest-
ment in hardware as well as unnecessarily high operating costs for collect-
ing and maintaining the data. It also holds the illusion for top manage-
ment that the large operational data base may be capable of providing all
the data which could be of use in their decisions , and which can be auto-
mated. It is clear to us that such is not the case.
e . Decision Centered
The basic purpose of the manager in an organization is to
make decisions. Decision making depends on many factors, but prime among
these is the information available. It is logical to therefore consider a
decision-oriented MIS. Additionally, in the framework of Gorrv and Scott

Morton in Figure II-U, a decision-oriented system would appear to be a
method for expanding the applicability of MIS toward the less structured
management control and strategic planning areas. Simply stated, that is
the case for such an approach. Whether this is reasonable remains to be
seen and is the topic of this paper.
The danger of this approach lies in becoming focused on what decisions
are made versus what decisions sh ould be made. Hopefully at this point




Among several authors who mention a "functional" orientation,
18 3 9
Dearden ' " seems to come closest to what we intend. The idea would be
to analyze the system by looking at each of the major functions performed
in the organization. Dearden 's views that there should be separate finan-
cial, inventory control, personnel, etc. subsystems seem to illustrate the
major difficulty. Specifically, it tends to isolate each block and concen-
trate en what is within, with little attention to the interfaces between
blocks. As with the decision-oriented system, the coupling of the function-
al orientation and the model-based approach provides another new alternative
to the system designer.
3. Other Considerations
While not dealt with explicitly in the previous discussions on the
basic types of analysis and orientation, there are a number of other points
that must be considered in the design of an information system. The most
important of these are user involvement and the cost benefit tradeoff in-
volved in the design process. There arc many others, but it is net the
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intent of this paper to discuss in detail the procedure of building good
models, or to discuss the very real problems of programming, machine com-
patibility, or system implementation and the like.
User involvement is not a new concept, but all too often it has been
neglected in the past. In some cases it appears that the user was ne-
glected entirely; in others, the designer thought he was obtaining user in-
volvement, when in fact the end product and its disuse by management demon-
strated the fallacy (the Gershefsky Sun Oil Company case is a glowing ex-
ample). Another example of the misuse of this principle is seen in the
naval shipyard MIS discussed here where some low-level management was ap-
parently involved in the design process, but the bulk of middle-level and
higher management apparently was not. Zani suggests an information system
"...smartly tailored to the company from the top down, and not merely
patched together from the bottom up in a crazy quilt of residues from auto-
mated clerical procedures." He further states:
"To ensure that the framework will actually be used, however, top
management must take a more prominent role in the design process
than it has hitherto. Most experts agree that top-management sup-
port and participation are necessary for effective design, but they
generally state that this support is necessary only for budget con-
trol of the data-processing group... Top management must start the
design process--i .e . must first delineate the organizations strat-
egy, structure, and decision-making process for the specialists
in the design group, and then make sure that the specialist de-






Zani is overly enthusiastic about the role of top management; in fact,
one must design using a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches.
But, his point about top management involvement and the success of an MIS
is clear. Blumenthal states that "...the user organization is responsible
for carrying out investigatory activities leading to a determination of
21
needs...." Whether or not one agrees with Zani or Blumenthal, it is clear
that without active user participation in its design, an information system
is doomed to fail because it will almost certainly be rejected by its in-
tended users.
The cost/benefit tradeoff involved in the design process comes to light
in the determination of how detailed the analysis and eventual design will
be. It is obvious that given sufficient time and funds, every decision (in
a decision-oriented approach for example) a manager makes could be analyzed,
and eventually be supported by a very complex MIS. However, although the
benefixs of such a system would be unquestionable, the cost for any firm
would be astronomical! Nor could the system be completed in any finite
period of time. It is clear that the design process should focus on the
critical relationships within an organization and seek to provide informa-
tion that the manager needs to perform the key tasks.
4. Selection
The alternative approaches and orientations discussed suggest that
a model-based, decision-oriented design is an appropriate method for- the de-
sign of an MIS. The combination can potentially be very responsive to pro-
viding a useful and effective system which will aid the manager in improving
the management process. The advantages have already been discussed above
and in Chapter I. The chapters that follow discuss our efforts to use this
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method and the results obtained. The next section of this chapter
describes the procedures we utilized.
C. Procedure
1. General
In order to apply the model-based, decision-oriented method de-
veloped above to the design cf an information system for management of a
naval shipyard, it was necessary to have a general procedure. As discussed
in Chapter I, due to practical considerations, our interest was focused on
the Production Department of the Boston Naval Shipyard at three different
levels of management. It was also our intent to pursue only the analysis
and development steps of the design process. The diagram in Figure II-5
is the basic procedure we established. Not shown on the diagram is the
time we utilized researching systems analysis and data gathering tech-
niques. The means of accomplishing the procedure are described in the re-
mainder of this section.
2 . Systems Analysis
a. Formulate the Normative Model
Both of the authors had prior experience with naval shipyards
,
but in the role of "customer," and even this was several years prior to this
project. To formulate the normative model, it was therefore necessary to
familiarize ourselves with the basic shipyard system and organization.
This was accomplished in several ways. We first attended a five-day
course on the shipyard MIS conducted by Harbridge House, Inc. The major-
ity of the other participants were shipyard foremen. Ideally, this would
have been more valuable had we attended the course when we were constructing
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the detailed descriptive model, but tine constraints did not permit it. The
next step was to tour the shipyard physical plant with the able and knowl-
edgeable Mr. McKenzie, a long time employee of the yard. Coincident with
the tour were several interviews with middle- and upper-level managers,
each generally of an hour duration. This took about one-and-a-half weeks,
during which there were unavoidable periods of delay and waiting. We also
read publications such as Shipyard Regulations
, the Planning, Production
and Control Manual
,
portions of the Shipyard MIS manuals, etc. Of prime im-
portance during this period were discussions between the authors at the end
of each day which attempted to relate our observations to our prior knowledge
of "ideal" systems--our initial "normative" model. Prior to commencing our
detailed descriptive study, therefore, we had formulated a normative model
that was applicable to the shipyard environment. Our major attention
throughout was on major decision areas, what managers should be involved in
those areas, and what information was required. Where possible we attempted
to address specific decisions.
b . Formulate the Descriptive Model
The major activity in constructing the detailed descriptive
model was actually observing the managers and recording their- decisions.
The method utilized is discussed in the next section of this chapter. It-
was arbitrarily decided that a one-week period would be spent with each
manager. We each observed two foremen and jointly observed the Repair Of-
ficer and Production Officer. This added to the descriptive modeling that
necessarily occurred in the previous step. Additionally, we interviewed
several other people , and expanded interviews with some of the people we
had talked to earlier. We examined messages, mail, MIS outputs and ether

documents. It must be noted that this was done on a random basis, but only
due to the time and manpower constraints. More formal techniques might be
appropriate in a full scale design effort. The completion of the observa-
tion periods marked the end of our planned descriptive data gathering. As
anticipated, however, we occasionally had to reopen the manuals or seek more
information from various managers to amplify and clarify our knowledge.
From this compiled information, we constructed the descriptive model of what
decisions were made, who made them, and what information and information
sources they used.
c. System Requirements
The specification of the system requirements was accomplished
by utilizing summarized statements of the normative and descriptive models
using an outline of the normative model as a guide. This served to focus
our attention on all relevant areas, and provided a logical base for develop-
ment of the requirements. It clearly exposed both the strong and week areas
of the system, and from that framework were developed the specific system re-
quirements. They were a coordinated series of statements that provided the
input to procede with the next phase, the System Development.
3. System Development
System development involved us in trying to design the specifics
of the data collection and the information outputs which would implement
the system requirements. In most cases, the current MIS system already had
the needed data. Where this was not true , we attempted to make the data in-
put function simple and compatible with the current MIS. As throughout the




For us to portray that our efforts were divided so neatly into the
above steps would hopefully cause the reader to question the veracity of our
description. In actuality, we were continually cycling through the steps as
we actively participated in the data gathering. The discipline of organiz-
ing and writing this paper then forced us into a more systematic progression
through the loop. Even then, however, we were jumping ahead and/or going
back to other phases. The point is that the process, in fact, was iterative .
Conceivably, one could say that iteration is an excuse for whatever short-
comings the basic process has. We prefer to look upon it more kindly and
recognize that it does occur and probably should occur. Throughout the
process, we followed the basic paths we had previously developed, but we
anticipated the iterative nature, and therefore were able to use it to ad-
vantage .
D. Data Gathering Methods
1. General
Having developed a procedure, the designer must next address the task
of selection of appropriate methods of data acquisition and analysis. It is
clear that the problem definition and approach will have a significant effect
on the methods eventually selected. A brief review of possible methods, and
the rationale used by the authors in selection is presented. Finally, the
process used in data reduction and analysis is described.
2 . Methods Considered
The three methods considered—interviews /questionnaires , diaries,
observation— are amply discussed in the literature. An excellent summary of
22






This method of data collection is espoused by many authors on
the subject of information system design. However, one must understand the
implications if this method is selected. The manager may tend to become
the researcher and express himself in normative rather than descriptive
terms. As McGregor states:
"The manager's verbal statements about his style are after-the-
fact generalizations that involve considerable rationalization.
Often what he says about his style appears to others to be in-
9 3
consistent with his day-to-day behaviour."
Interviews do allow the researcher to delve into areas which he thinks are
important, but this will prove rewarding only if he is right, Mailed or
otherwise distributed questionnaires have the advantage of allowing a small
number of researchers to contact a large number of managers.
b . Di aries
The diary is "an activity-by-activity tabulation of a number
of parameters recorded by a manager." It is a fairly popular method a-
mong researchers and often utilizes precoded words to simplify the diary
keeper's task. It has the advantage of making it possible to study many
managers for extended time periods, but possesses the same lack of objec-
tivity as the interview/questionnaire. There also may exist some inconsist-
ency in recording due to the differing degree of attention given by the
diary keepers in maintaining the records. Mintzberg cites two related
criticisms: "(1) ...the neat categories required for diary recording are





In this method, the researcher relies heavily on his ability
to interpret and record the manager's activities, information sources, and
decisions. It is essential that the observer know what to look for, and
how to describe or classify the events that he is witness to. As Carlson
states , "Without such a conceptual framework , there would be no way of se-
lecting among the infinite number of factual observations which can be made
about any concrete phenomena...." In this process, the observer acts as
a kind of "black box," taking as inputs his observations, and producing his
interpretation and categorization of them as output. As in the other meth-
ods described, there will be a bias introduced, but at least this bias is
consistent across all observations because it belongs to the observer. Two
relevant criticisms of this method are put forth by Rosemary Stewart in her
comparative study of data collection methods:
(1) "It is hard for an observer to follow all that is being done,
without interrupting the manager, even if he is familiar with the
job he is observing. The difficulty becomes much greater when ob-
serving an unfamiliar ... job . "




Although each of the possible alternatives has limitations, it be-
came evident that the method which was most compatible with the model-based,
decision-oriented approach was the observation technique. This method ap-
peared to be optimal from the standpoints of objectivity and adaptability to
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decision analysis, as well as requiring the least effort on the part of the
manager under observation. The manager bias generated by both diaries and
interviews was deemed unacceptable, and the central deficiency of observa-
tion, that of developing a conceptual framework as proposed by Carlson, was
overcome as a by-product of the normative model development. It was clear
to both of us that we should attempt to minimize interruption of the manager
under observation, although some intrusion could not be avoided. As visitors
to the shipyard, both we and the people we observed were aware that some
items which might come up during the observation period could be deemed con-
fidential, and thus not disclosable to us. However, this situation was
practically non-existent, and the frankness of our subjects was both evident
and appreciated.
To aid the observation process, a data collection sheet based on indi-
vidual decisions was devised prior to the initial observation. Attempts
were made to ensure that it was both simple and flexible yet complete.
Based on the first week's observation experience, the data sheet was re-
vised, the final form being shown in Figure II-6.
E. Data Reduction and Analysis :
During the four-week observation period, the authors met almost daily
to discuss the implications of the data obtained. Additionally, upon com-
pletion of observation of a particular manager, summaries were drawn up
outlining:
a.) the major decision areas and their content;
b.) the informational source the manager interacted with in
the decision (who or what document);









































d.) the relative importance of each decision area;
e.) the approximate percentage of the manager's time spent
in each area (foreman only);
f
.
) the adequacy of support given by the information system in
each decision area.
From this analysis , diagrams were constructed to illuminate informational
flow and decision area interrelationships.
Two significant decision related areas were also felt to merit con-
sideration in more detail: the present shipyard cont/rol system and the





1. J. F. Rockart, "Model Based Systems Analysis: A Methodology and
Case Study," Industrial Management Review
,
II, 2, 4 (1970).
2. F. G. Withington, The Use of Computers in Business Organizations
,
(Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., Reading, Mass., 1970).
3. R. H. Gregory and R. L. Van Horn, Automatic Data Processing Systems:
Principles and Procedures
,




4. T. B. Glans , B. Grad, D. Holstein, W. E. Meyers, and R. N. Schmidt,
Management Systems , (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1968),
p. 12-14.
5. Rockart, op. cit.
6. T. P. Gerrity , Jr., The Design of Man-Machine Decision Systems , unpub-
lished PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass. , June 1970.
7. G. Nadler , "An Investigation of Design Methodology," Management Science ,
June 1967, p. 642-655.
8. D. C. Carroll, "Implications of On-line, Real-time Systems," in C. A.
Meyers (ed.), The Impact of Computers on Management
,
(M. I. T. Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 1967), p. 140-167.
9. W. F. Pounds, "The Process of Problem Finding," Industrial Management
Review , 11, 1, 1-19 (1969).
10. Gerrity, op. cit.




13. R. N. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems : A Framework for Analysis
,
(Harvard Business School Division of Research, Cambridge, Mass. 1965).
14. G. A. Gorry and M. S. Scott-Morton, "A Framework for Management Informa-
tion Systems," Sloan Management Review , 13, 1, 55-70 (1971).
15. Gerrity, op.cit.
16. Ibid.
17 . Gerri ty , op . ci t
.
18. J. Dearden, "MIS IS A MIRAGE," Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb (1972),
p. 90-99.
19. J. Dearden, "How to Organize Information Systems," Harvard Business Re-
view , March-April, 1965, p. 65-73.
20. W. F. Zani , "Blueprint for MIS," Harvard Business Review , Nov-Dec.
(1970).
21. S. C. Blumenthal, Management Information Systems; A Framework for Plan -
ning and Development
,
(Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,
1969), p. 105.
22. H. Mintzberg, The Manager at Work—Determining His Activities, Roles
,
and Programs by Structured Observation , unpublished PhD Thesis
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 1968.
23. D. McGregor, The Professional Manager , (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), p. 70
24. Mintzberg, op.cit.
25. Ibid.
26. S. Carlson, Executive Behavior: A Study of the Work Loads and Working
Methods of Managing Directors
,




27. R. Stewart, "The Use of Diaries to Study Managers Jobs," The Journal of




THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD—BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
A. General
As discussed in the last chapter, both of the authors had prior experi-
ence with naval shipyards, but only in the role of "customer." Our very in-
complete knowledge dictated that a sizable effort be expended toward achieve-
ment of a working knowledge of a naval shipyard. The ten naval shipyards
are each organized and operated in a standard manner. Although management
style and emphasis vary among the yards, Boston Naval Shipyard can be con-
sidered as representative. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
naval shipyard setting to provide the reader with the necessary background
and perspective with which to evaluate our efforts, especially in the areas
of modeling and design.
B. Mission and Capability
The official mission assigned to the Boston Naval Shipyard is:
"To provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft;
to perform authorized work in connection with construction, conver-
sion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting of
ships and craft, as assigned; to perform manufacturing, research,
development, and test work, as assigned; and to provide services
and material to other activities and units, as directed by compe-
tent authority."
The principle role of the shipyard is the overhaul, repair and conver-
sion of naval ships, which for Boston are primarily destroyers. It should
be noted that while these tasks are also traditionally carried out by
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civilian shipyards, naval shipyards in addition must:
- provide logistic support for ships and dependent shore facilities;
- perform research, development and test work for the Department of
the Navy ; and
- outfit ships built at civilian shipyards.
Naval shipyards owe their continued existence primarily to the necessary
industrial capacity base capable of rapid expansion in time of national emer-
gency which they provide. Although Boston Naval Shipyard now employs approx-
imately 5500 people, during World War II this figure was roughly 50,000.
Also of importance are the workforce stability provided by law which pre-
vents government shipyard employees from striking, and the competition or
standard by which to judge civilian shipyard performance.
By any standard, Boston Naval Shipyard is a large industrial complex.
2
Its approximate annual statistics include:
Business volume $100 million
Parts Inventory $121 million
45 ,000 line items
Material transactions $300 million
100,000 individual receipts
500,000 individual expenditures
Design drawings issued 400 thousand
Job orders issued 50 thousand
Job instructions 700 thousand
Although capabilities vary between shipyards , largely because of the
principal ship type that each supports , the naval shipyard complex can handle
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the full spectrum of technical support for the modern Navy, including so-
phisticated guided missile installation and repair, nuclear power plant
installation and refuelling, and drydocking of the largest vessels in the
Navy's inventory. A significant portion of the nation's shipbuilding capa-
bility is vested in its naval shipyards.
C. Organizational Structure
The organization of a naval shipyard conforms to the standard pre-
scribed by Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS), except where
deviations are specifically approved by NAVSHIPS. The Boston Naval Ship-
yard has adopted this organization with only minor changes. There is no
capability at Boston to perform nuclear repair work, and the Computer Appli-
cations Support and Development Office (CASDO) and the Planning and Esti-
mating for Repair and Alterations (ASW) Office (PERA(ASW)) report to the
Shipyard Commander only for administrative purposes. The line departments
are functionally separated and report directly to the Shipyard Commander.
There are several supporting staff departments which also report to the
Commander. The activities and planning of the departments are coordinated
by several working groups and committees which report to the Commander. The
standard organization is presented in figure III-l.
The Production Department is organized as shown in figure III-2 with
the exception that Boston has no nuclear capability. The Production Officer
is a military officer and is primarily responsible for the accomplishment of
work assigned in a timely and minimum-cost fashion. There are two main
lines in the organization that support him.
The four group superintendents and their individual organizations are
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shops for which he is responsible and each shop has a shop superintendent
that reports to his group superintendent. There is an administrative and
planning staff for each group. The shops have general foremen who report
to the shop superintendent, and foremen who report to the general foremen.
Generally, a foreman will have approximately 15-20 mechanics and laborers
in his team, and a general foreman will have four or five foremen. All
personnel in this line are civilians.
The "staff" organization of the Production Department is headed by the
Repair Officer. Through his Assistant Repair Officers and Ship Superintend-
ents, he directs and monitors the progress of ship and shop work. All of
these personnel are military officers. This part of the department can be
considered as project oriented, and the ship superintendents act much as
project managers. The Production Control Branch through the Repair Officer
provides scheduling, work load forecasing and work progressing functions.
These personnel are all civilians.
The overlay of the two basic lines is shown in Figure III-3. The proj-
ect orientation of the Repair Officer line is apparent, and the work load of
specific job orientation of the Group Superintendent line is also.
Though not studied in detail in this project, the functioning of the
Planning Department is very important to the Production Department. There
are many interfaces between them which will be discussed later. The organi-
zation of the Planning Department is shown in Figure III-4.
D. Shipyard Industrial Operations
•As stated earlier, the primary mission cf the Boston Naval Shipyard is



































major operation, and will be the basis of the following discussion. The
other productive efforts are very similar.
The essential conditions which must exist before an overhaul begins
are
:
- The ship must be available for the uninterrupted accomplishment
of work
.
- The scope of the work must be agreed upon by the customer and
the shipyard, arranged in order of priority, and specifically
authorized for accomplishment.
- Material must be available through the Navy supply system, by
purchase, or locally (the shipyard) through the shop stores.
- Sufficient skilled manpower must be available to perform the
planned work
.
There are three stages of a regular overhaul--the advance planning
stage, the short-range planning stage, and the overhaul availability stare.
1. Advance Planning
This stage varies in duration and may extend from as long as 18
months to about two months before the commencement of the actual work per-
formance. During this period, plans progress from a very rough state to a
more defined state as decisions are made on contemplated work items , in-
cluding repairs and. alterations. The ship's personnel generate work requests
for repair items and they establish the priority for accomplishment of the
repair items. The requests are forwarded to the shipyard via the type com-
mander (Commander Cruiser Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet is an ex-
ample). It is the type commander that is the "customer" for most repair
items. He approves or disaporoves the work requests submitted, and he funds
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the work from authorized appropriations designated for overhaul and repair.
Alterations are under the control of the various systems commands (NAVSHi
NAVORD, NAVE LEX, etc.). Prior to the overhaul, alterations called for by
the Chief of Naval Operations Material Improvement Plan are reviewed, the
availability of funds and special material is determined, and a summary of
authorized alterations is forwarded to the shipyard by the systems commands.
2. Short-Range Planning
The short-range planning stage varies from six to eight months be-
fore the arrival of the ship to the time it becomes available at the ship-
yard. It is specific rather than broad as in the advance planning stage.
Lists of desired repairs and alterations are received by the Planning Depart-
ment, and planners and estimators for each trade prepare job orders which
provide estimates of time, labor, material and the cost of each repair and
alteration. Direct labor standards are employed, where they are available,
to accomplish this planning. The job orders are broken down into component
key operations (KEYOPS) which describe the work elements of the job, which
shop or shops will perform the work, and the number of labor hours estimated
by shop to be necessary for job completion. Milestone schedules are also
prepared. Milestones are major events in the overhaul to which job order
and KEYOP completions are tied.
When it is possible, representatives from both the Planning and the
Production Departments inspect the ship prior to its arrival at a pre-
arrival conference. They check plans, determine what design services and
special material items are necessary, and check that preliminary plans agree
with the work to be performed. When the ship arrives in the yard, an arriv-
al conference is conducted to discuss the planning package, the ship's force
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work plans, and to review the scope, priority and authorizations for each
item.
3. Overhaul Availability
The third stage of the overhaul is the performance of the v/ork , and
this is the responsibility of the Production Department. The job orders is-
sued are the basis for all work performed, for all material requisitions, and
for the allocations of funds. A sample job order is found in Appendix A. At
least one day before the scheduled end of the overhaul, a departure confer-
ence is held and ship's representatives sign off the outstanding job orders
completed. If any work is left outstanding, special procedures exist for
settlement. Appropriate dock trials and sea trials are usually conducted
prior to the departure conference to demonstrate the overall effectiveness
of the completed repairs and alterations.
The above description is an ideal framework. What is already a very
complex job shop type of environment is further complicated by the difficulty
(if not impossibility) of fully specifying the planned work package prior- to
the arrival of the ship in the yard. Many items cannot be inspected prior to
arrival and the scope of needed repairs is frequently defined on historical
data. If the workload on the Planning Department is high, detailed planning
and design work (job orders and drawings) can lag and cause disruptions in
production. Material needed may not have been ordered with enough lead time,
may not have been ordered at all, or may be "lost."
The overhaul and repair of naval ships is therefore a complex task de-
manding the best of management skills. Timely and accurate information is




The heart of the shipyard financial mechanism is the Havy Industrial
Fund (NIF). The NIF is a revolving fund established by Congress to provide
working capital for shipyard use. Under this program, a cash allocation was
made to each shipyard at the time the fund was established. The NIF is re-
plenished by billing customers for work performed, materials supplied, and
overhead.
The NIF provides shipyard management with a fiscal environment which
closely parallels that of a civilian commercial activity. The profit/loss
situation is replaced by variance between predicted end costs and actual
costs. The goal of shipyard management is to break even; any variance,
whether positive or negative, is applied to the NIF.
In practice, the predicted end cost of a ship overhaul is formulated
at a point equating to 45% elapsed time in the overhaul. This fixed price
establishes "firm incentives for management ":o obtain performance within the
designated fund limitations, thereby encouraging efficiency and economy.'""
The fixed-price technique, and historical performance create a "buyer-seller"
relationship which allows the customer to compare the price of goods and
services obtained with similar purchases from other naval shipyards or pri-
vate industry. This helps provide additional incentive to shipyard manage-
ment.
F. Implications of Government Policy
One cannot obtain a complete grasp of the inner workings of Boston Naval
Shipyard without first considering the effect of governmental policies. It
is public knowledge that the yard has faced the prospect of closure for a
number of years , and the work force is slowly but steadily being reduced.
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These reductions in force (RIF's) have been applied to the other yards as
well as Boston, and are consistent with the reduction in ship strength
which has accompanied the winding down of the U. S. effort in Southeast-
Asia.
It is at once clear that the threat of closure and reductions in force
have had an affect on the performance of the Boston yard, but just how it
manifests itself is not clear. One possible conclusion is that the employees
might work more diligently in an effort to make the yard look good on a com-
parative basis with other yards , but this is tempered by the fact that with
the reduction in available ship work, Boston might be the first to go anyway
because of its older physical plant (in recent years, some of the naval ship-
yards have undergone modernization, but Boston was net included). Addition-
ally, reductions in force can only be pursued to the point where overhead ex-
penses make the yard incompetita ve . It must also be considered that the
RIF's caused the release of younger, junior workers thus causing an upward
shift in the average age of a shipyard employee to the present 45 years with
attendent problems of productivity, training, etc.
One other aspect of government policy that strongly influences shipyard
management is the steady emphasis within the Department of Defense (DOD) for
standardization of management techniques. This emphasis within the Navy has
resulted in development of the "Standardized" Management Information System
for Naval Shipyards. Shipyards, however, have traditionally been allowed to
develop and utilize techniques of their own. As the reader proceeds, he will
realize that this conflict has resulted in one of the major reasons that the
MIS is not effectively utilized in the Production Department. Specifically,
MIS was developed for management to control operations at the KEYOP level
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and Boston manages primarily at the milestone level.
Finally, there is the political factor. Some feel that the yard has
sufficient "friends" in Washington to ensure survival regardless of its
performance, while others say these same people are letting them down and
allowing other interests to prevail.
G. Current Shipyard MIS </
The shipyard MIS is a cost-oriented system developed around three major
functional areas of operational control involving the four productive work-
associated departments in the shipyard.





Comptroller - —>» Financial
Supply >»• Material
Each MIS functional subsystem is further broken down into elements
called "applications."
MIS
Subsystem: Industrial Financial Material













A brief description of the MIS subsystems and applications follows.
Emphasis is placed on the industrial applications since the Production De-
partment was the focal point of our efforts. Sample HIS outputs from the
Industrial Subsystem are in Appendix B.
1 . The Industrial Subsystem
The Industrial Subsystem is concerned with the planning and schedul-
ing of work, forecasting of manpower and material needs, identification and
correction of production-related problem areas , and evaluation of the produc-
tive effort. Toward this end it employs five applications:
a. The Workload Forecasting Application provides management with
information to help balance the workload. It deals with two requirements:
a total man-hour forecast and the distribution of this forecast over time.
Inputs to the application include work forcp
,
predicted work (forecast over
time through the use of historical manning curves), loaded work (i.e., work
scheduled and issued against current job orders) and expenditures. Output
reports indicate what the anticipated shipyard workload will be, by ship and
by shop, and force distribution reports indicate man-day expenditures and
compare current manning information to forecast figures by ship and shop.
This information can be used by management tc accept/reject additional work,
reduce or increase the work force, arrange for loans /transfers between shops,
and allocate leave.
b. The Production Control Application is concerned with control of
productive work. Inputs into the application include scheduled shop man-
power loading information, daily direct labor and overtime expenditures,
labor estimates, authorized work, scheduled and actual dates for all cus-
tomer and job orders, and associated key operations (KEYOPS). The output
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provides information concerning KEYOP and customer order status. The ap-
plication is intended to assist shipyard management in monitoring KEYOPS
which are scheduled to start, scheduled to complete, and are above or below
scheduled manpower authorization. Any of these conditions constitutes a
"jeopardy" situation.
c. The Production Scheduling Application is based primarily on
PERT/CPM methods. Inputs include descriptions of the sequence and scope of
all KEYOPS, estimated and actual start dates, and estimated completion
dates. PERT/CPM outputs include reports which provide management with net-
work information concerning schedule dates, critical jobs, and potential
areas of logic improvement. Actual network diagrams must be produced by
manual means. We did not observe the use of this application during our
visit to the shipyard; it is apparently utilized only for large complex con-
versions .
d. The Pe rformance Measurement Application is concerned principal-
ly with actual man-day expenditures versus work standards, and the timeli-
ness of job completions. Inputs include scheduled and actual shop workloads,
completion dates, job allowances (i.e., standards), and actual expenditures.
Outputs conveniently array this data for evaluation of production supervisors
and planners .
e. The Design Application is concerned with the status and schedul-
ing of drawings, special projects, test memos and the like associated with
job orders. The system contains an inventory of this information with re-
lated allowances, expenditures, schedules and status.
2 . The financial Subsystem
This subsystem deals with the flow of funds in the shipyard. It
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provides controls over basic system inputs, validates charges to job orders,
provides accounting controls over productive and overhead work, and gener-
ates shipyard-wide budgeting data. The subsystem has three applications:
a. The Cost Application is concerned with all shipyard transac-
tions that account for cash flow, including amounts due from customers and
the dollar value of materials and labor charged to customer job orders. It
maintains control over errors that enter the accounting system, validates
data on input transactions, and maintains historical data that serve as an
effective audit trail and as a basis for predictive cost.
b. The Budget Application deals with the generation of data to
budget shipyard workloads with yardwide overhead expenditures. The applica-
tion generates: labor summary outputs by department; a summary of employee
borrows and loans among shipyard shops; leave used, accrued and available;
budget estimates for overhead by cost centers.
c. The Payroll Application , besides handling the obvious biweekly
payroll, processes all time cards and other cost records. It also, computes
labor costs for work performed, and monitors employee leave accounts and pay-
roll savings (i.e., maintains a payroll record for each employee).
3. The Material Management Subsystem
The Material Management Subsystem is designed to provide nearly con-
tinuous quantitative, financial and status information on industrial materi-
als. Industrial materials are those materials and services purchased with
shipyard operating capital provided through the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF).
The materials managed may be either (1) "shop stores," which are regularly-
used items, (2) "direct material inventory" (DMI), which consists of items
ordered against a specific job order for a given ship, or (3) services

-62-
(transport, rent, printing, etc.).
a. The Industrial Material Application processes inputs of materi-
al requests (via job material lists—JML's) , receipts, issues, etc., and
provides outputs dealing with inventory, commitments, status and accounts
payable
.
b. The Shop Stores Application is designed to aid management in
its effort to control shop stores material—basically an inventory control
problem. The application provides information in the form of shop store
catalogs, as well as lists of stock status and projected material require-
ments .
c. The Accounts Payable Reconciliation Application , as its title
implies, reconciles two shipyard accounts: Accounts Payable, into which an
entry is made when material is received, and Material-in-Transit , containing
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MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE SHIPYARD
A. General
Having provided the reader with a brief description of the problem,
our intended method of solution, and necessary background information con-
cerning naval shipyards, we are now in a position to proceed with the actual
problem solution. In this chapter, the "normative model" of the shipyard
Production Department is first presented followed by the "descriptive mod-
el." The reader is reminded that the construction of these models was not
accomplished in a purely sequential fashion; instead, some descriptive
knowledge was required prior to construction of the normative model, and
the descriptive model was started prior to completion of the normative
process
.
The last section of the chapter compares the normative and descriptive
models and establishes the system requirements. It can be seen that this
chapter is the "Systems Analysis" procedure illustrated in Figure II-5 of
Chapter II.
B. The Normative Model of the Production Department
1. Background
The work performed in the overhaul cf a naval ship varies from
relatively simple tasks such as scraping and painting to complex one-of-a-
kind or first-time modifications which require design effort and the co-
ordination of persons from several skilled trades. Material must be pre-
ordered, it must be there on time, the people with the appropriate skill
must be available, nlans and drawings must be completed and issued, and
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the work must be scheduled in a manner which keeps a balanced work load on
each of the shops. The key elements to the successful operation of this
complex industrial activity are good planning, scheduling and control. The
operation is very similar in principal to the industrial job shop model.
This will therefore serve as the base of our "normative" model. The essen-
tial elements of the job shop and how they apply to the shipyard and to the
Production Department in particular are discussed below. That is followed
by several other elements we feel are essential to a good MIS/Control system.
The implications of these on decision making will then be considered.
2. The Shipyard As A Job Shop Activity
a. Scheduling
The smoothness of the day-to-day operations in a naval ship-
yard depend greatly on the effectiveness of the scheduling efforts. The job
shop is essentially a scheduling problem. In both cases, the difficulties
stem from the unrepetitive nature of the work being performed.
Scheduling in a job shop has three distinct elements. We will call
them advance planning, static scheduling and dynamic scheduling. This
framework was developed from several readings.





"The control of production in job shops can be considered a two-
level problem. The first, or macrolevel, consists of balancing the
backlog of work and manpower in the shop so as to maintain a level
of machine and manpower utilization consistent with the objectives
of management
.
"...the first problem that must be dealt with is the establishing
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of a manpower capacity and work load so as to maintain a desired
level of machine and manpower utilization while adhering to pre-
scribed order completion schedules.
"The second, or microlevel, consists of sequencing orders at
the functional operation level in a manner consistent with pre-
scribed order completion schedules. Although the sequencing prob-
lem exists within the framework of the above problem, it is the
crux of the job shop control problem. Without the ability to se-
quence jobs in the shot) in a logical manner, there is little
chance that the above objectives will be realized."
The "microlevel" can be viewed as being two distinct steps or stages.
2
Emery has described them as follows:
"The net effectivness of conventional scheduling really hinges
on the effectiveness of a two-stage process. Scheduling is the
first stage •:nd dispatching is the second. The ultimate test of
this system is its ability to meet delivery promises, maintain a
low level of inventory, and utilize capacity efficiently."
He differentiates between scheduling and dispatching in the following
way:
"It is. the function of scheduling to plan in advance the flow
of these orders through the shop and to the customer.
"Inherent in the actual running of a job shop is the problem
of deciding which order should be given priority when two or more
are waiting to go on the same machine. It is the function of dis-





"...the job shop... (has) two scheduling modes with regard to
time: static scheduling, a loading of facilities to some preset
limit before the actual day of operation; and dynamic schedul-
ing, a continuous rescheduling of facilities which takes into ac-
count the latest events and conditions up to the moment each
segment of the schedule is executed."
The necessity for updating the schedule is given by Carroll.
"Because the schedules are issued well ahead of execution, they
are subject to prediction errors of two types. First, errors
in processing time estimates can result in the infeasibility of
the schedule. ...Second, there are numerous events which can-
not be predicted as to their average incidence. Among these are
machine breakdowns
, unacceptable quality performance , worker ab-
senteeism, strikes, lockouts, and acts of God. When they occur,
the best laid schedule is no longer valid. Departures from
validity naturally increase as time passes after calculation of
the schedule, so there is a time-related decay process. When
departures have to be made because of decay, they are typically
made on the basis of local considerations. The data base defect
leading to decay is lack of currency, i.e., failure to update
the scheduling model when departures from predictions occur."
The "macrolevel" described by Bulkin, et. al. , which is often called
"aggregate scheduling," has the characteristics of advance planning. It
is the attempt to balance workload and productive capacity. The "micro-
level" activity includes Emery's two-stage process. His scheduling
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function develops the detailed plan for accomplishment of accepted work
prior to commencement of the work. Rockart called this "static schedul-
ing," and we adopt that terminology. Emery's second stage is called dis-
patching—deciding which job to perform now. This is one aspect of
Rockart' s "dynamic scheduling." The other is the need to update the orig-
inal or "model" schedule as explained by Carroll. Dynamic scheduling





) Application of the Scheduling Framework to the Shipyard
Given this three-stage description of scheduling in a
job shop, we will now show how it is applicable to the shipyard.
The scheduling efforts essentially begin up to 18 months prior to the
start of an overhaul when the advance planning begins. An effort must be
made by the yard to accept a work package that will be within the physical
plant capabilities and which will balance the work evenly over time so that
each trade (shop) will be fully utilized. The skills required are not such
that the yard can hire /fire as a matter of routine policy and under-
utilized workers cause excess direct labor charges to authorized work is-
sued. Since fixed price contracts are negotiated, such excess charges must
ultimately be recouped by an increased overhead rate in order to balance
the shipyard NIF (Naval Industrial Fund--see Chapter III for a discussion of
the NIF). The first step in scheduling is therefore adequate planning.
The activity of a shipyard is keyed to the detailed scheduling which
occurs during the short-range planning phase. The techniques utilized are
those commonly found in other job shop environments and include Gantt
charting and PERT/CPM. This phase is complicated in a shipyard. Each job
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issued by the Planning Department must be considered in two key manners by
the schedulers in the Production Department. The Planning Department must
ensure that effective sequencing of jobs which are key to meeting the com-
pletion date is accomplished-, and must also ensure that the work scheduled
for a particular shop does not exceed its work force capacity. The sched-
uler must be both project oriented and work load oriented. This aspect of
scheduling can be considered static scheduling--! .e
.
, scheduling for the
anticipated work before it commences.
The student and advocate of "Murphy's Law"--"If anything can go wrong,
it will! "--would be very content in a shipyard. According to Emery,
"Deviations in a schedule arise from three basic causes: (1) in-
feasibility and ineffectiveness of the existing schedule (2) er-
rors in estimating process time (3) unexpected events."
All of these "go wrong" in a naval shipyard for several reasons. Many jobs
accomplished in an overhaul cannot be fully detailed until the work begins
due to operational use which prevents disassembly and inspection of equip-
ment. Similarly, design changes, customer needs and priorities, funds
available, new work requested, changes in the work force and skill levels,
breakdown of machines, etc., are all subject to short-term modifications
and/or unpredictable (except in a probabilistic manner) occurrences. These
real-life issues require that the system provide for dynamic scheduling--
i.e., the capabilities to reschedule and to dispatch based on updated cur-
rent information that reflects the situation as it is, not as it was
planned.
' We have shown that the shipyard has all of the scheduling problems
that are characteristic of a job shop. In the following paragraphs, other
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characteri sties of a job shop are examined for applicability to the Ship-
yard Environment.
b. Priorities
Many of the conflicts for skills and materials which must be
confronted will be dispatched at the shop/foreman level in making daily work
assignment's to the mechanics. In order to have some control over this dis-
patching function and to insure that the assignments are in consonance with
upper management desires, there should be some formal or routine manner for
establishing priorities of job and project accomplishment. In a job shop,
this is typically a rule such as "first in, next up," or work on the task
with "earliest completion date," etc.
c. Control—Centralized versus Decentralized
A simple job shop will have a single control point for accom-
plishing the loading or scheduling. In the shipyard, this is true for the
advance planning and static scheduling functions but not for the dispatching
function or daily work assignments. Complete central control on a daily
basis of each job presently is unrealistic. There are too many jobs issued,
too many interactions between shops and skills, too much dependency en ma-
terial availability, and too much dependency on skill levels and technical
knowledge. To attempt to solve these problems by central control, would
require implementation cf the on-line, real-time information system espoused
7
by Carroll. Although we feel that would be an exciting scheme, it is cur-
rently not feasible. The shipyards are in the process of converting to
third-generation computers and are using all funds available for this con-
version. Thus, we will accept the real world constraint that such a system
is several years (at least) away and develop a system which improves the
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effectiveness of dispatching and dynamic scheduling. Each shop will re-
quire some form of control as will each project. The ideal system will al-
low conflicts between shop and project to be resolved quickly and at as
low a level as possible in the organization.
The latter point is essentially addressing the centralization versus
decentralization issue. The central control on a daily basis has already
been discussed and it was viewed as currently unrealistic. There is anoth-
er environmental issue that is pertinent. Naval shipyards have historical-
ly given operational decision making responsibility to lower level man-
agers. To attempt to supplant this with a system which is computer based
and centralized currently would not be accepted. The current MIS system
is not well utilized in the Production Department. If MIS is to aid the
management process in the future, the current emphasis should be on rela-
tively simple, straight forward information which aides the current deci-
sion process. This will gain management's confidence in computer-based
systems and allow for future improvements. We feel this is a very neces-
sary step in the evolution of a developing system,
d. Duration of Tasks
Each job performed in a job shop environment requires a unique
amount of time. In the shipyard significant steps have been made in de-
veloping engineered standards for planning and scheduling purposes; how-
ever, as ships get older, skill levels vary, equipment gets modified, and
newer equipment replaces old, these standards should be modified based on
historical performance. Only if the system permits time and material
charges to be honestly and accurately made to the job they are actually ex-
pended on will such updating have any meaning; i.e., --the historical cat-
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must be accurate. Thus, it is realized that the "typical" job shop has
relatively well-defined tasks that have known durations whereas the ship-
yard performs tasks that are less well defined and which have more varia-
tion in the time required to be performed.
Each of the above areas demonstrate the applicability of the job shop
model to the shipyard. This realization will have certain implications
when considering what decisions must be made within the Production Depart-
ment and at what level. After considering some other elements which we re-
gard to be essential to an effective and efficient information and control
system, these implications will be developed.
3. Other Aspects
a. The Control System
The design of an information system must be done in a manner
that supports the control system in which the managers must operate. How-
ever, the control system itself should be subjected to scrutiny and altered
or changed if appropriate. In this case, the adoption of the job shop
model implies that the control system needs to be responsive to those situa-
tions requiring dynamic scheduling and dispatching, and it should support
the advance planning and static scheduling functions. This idea stems from
g
Anthony's definition of operational control as "the process of assuring
that specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently" which
9
Carroll construes that in the job shop environment, include "the full hier-
archy of operating decisions from the aggregate production, inventory, and






"What is meant by control is simply obtaining system behavior in
accordance with some basic objectives or standards or some prede-
termined plan. ...The deci si on -making mechanism receives two
basic types of information, namely status measurements of the en-
tities or activities being controlled and goal (or budget, or
schedule, etc.) information from higher management levels. It
'integrates' these inputs on some procedure or decision rule and
issues a direction or order which prescribes (or effects) the de-
sired behavior of the entities. This 'feedback' loop. . .emphasizes
an important aspect of control, namely that control is both a de-
cision and information process. In discussing the efficacy of a
control process one cannot afford to ignore either process."
This supports the idea that the MIS designer is within his bounds to
alter and change the control system where necessary. It also indicates
that two types of information will be pertinent--"Where am I?" and "Where
am I supposed to be?"
Because of the large number of jobs issued and working at any one
time , both the MIS and the control system should be most sensitive to those
jobs most likely to cause a delay in completion and/or significant over ex-
penditures. The data should not impose any added administrative burdens on
the managers at any level, but rather should be a product of routine data
collection. Imposing new demands on a manager's time is unlikely to aid
the success of a new system or an alteration of an old one.
b. Performance Measurement
A need for an objective criteria to judge performance is ap-
parent. What that criteria should be is not clear at this stage of the
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model building. What is clear is that it must not cause managers to behave
in a manner inconsistent with the achievement of the shipyard goals and ob-
jectives. The major function of such performance measures in a naval ship-
yard is to tell both internal and external persons when the yard is or is
not doing its job. Since managers at all levels will strive to "do their
job"—meaning do well on the established criteria--a criteria which makes
the manager's goals the same as the shipyard's goals is necessary,
c. Communication
Communication is an all-inclusive term and it has the support
of all interested in good management. This point will not be labored upon
here but some aspects are considered important. A MIS system must have as
a basic purpose the promotion of the communication of good information. Our
"MIS" system is thought of as including all forms of communication within
the organization. It is therefore within the purview of the MIS designer to
consider ways to stimulate and foster the better flow of information of all
types--i.e., to strive for improved communication. Our model therefore re-
quires a system which promotes communication up and down in the organiza-
tion and between units in the organization. Such things as performance cri-
teria should not restrict these information flows. The MIS designer--
especially one approaching the problem as we are--must consider communication
in the context of how it influences decisions.
4. Implications for the Decision Process
If the job shop is adopted as the appropriate model and the other
aspects considered are accepted, some "ideal" or normative statements can be
made regarding what decisions should be made and who should make them. We
will be considering only the three managers we investigated, so the model

presented necessarily will be incomplete.
The major decisions in the Production Department will center around
some aspect of "scheduling"--the advance planning, the static scheduling,
and the dynamic scheduling, both rescheduling and dispatching.
The role of the Production Department in advanced planning should be a
determination of its ability to perform the work. It must advise the Plan-
ning Department (which is responsible for accepting new work) of this abil-
ity and what the impacts will be on already-accepted work, stability of the
work force, and other special problems. Since many factors will be impor-
tant in this area which will only come together at the Production Officer
level, it is believed that he should be actively involved in this area.
Considerations will include current productive work and problems, union re-
lations, hire/fire abilities, training, expected attrition of personnel,
historical data on past work, etc. Many pieces of information must be in-
corporated in the work load forecasting for the purpose of accepting future
work anC the Production Officer should be involved in coordinating them.
Static scheduling should be quite routine and involve little of the
time of the managers with whom this project is concerned. The Repair Officer
must be involved in approving major events and monitoring the scheduling
function. Two major inputs to the scheduling problem are job orders issued
by planning and needing scheduling and work already scheduled. In order
that work already scheduled be meaningful, there must be an effective means
of monitoring work in progress so that problems can be rescheduled--! .e
.
,
there must be a means to insure that work already scheduled is accurate and
up to date so that future scheduling can be done reliably.
It is clear then that static scheduling and dynamic scheduling are very
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interactive. The Repair Officer and the foremen will be very involved '
the dynamic scheduling. The foreman is the man with the most recent and ac-
curate picture of the status of a particular job. When he has problems, he
should be able to key some response to determine the magnitude of the problem
and its impact on other jobs and on the project as a whole. He lacks the
overall perspective but has the detailed knowledge and experience. For the
foreman to know if he has problems, he must know when his job is scheduled
for completion, what other work is scheduled, and how he immediately inter-
acts with other jobs and shops. Once he determines a problem exists, it is
in his interest to insure dissemination of the problem is made to higher
level management and that efforts are undertaken to reschedule if necessary.
If they are not aware of the problem, the schedulers may continue assigning
new work to his area and an even greater problem may ensue. Therefore,
there must be a feedback loop enabling dynamic scheduling to occur and it
should be keyed at the foreman level. The Repair Officer is responsible for
all productive work. Any rescheduling which will affect completion of major
events (called milestones--drydocking date for example) should be his re-
sponsibility. Similarly, changes with potential impact on the overall com-
pletion of a particular ship or which might affect other current projects
should involve his considerations. If the rescheduling is likely to impact
on future work, the Production Officer must become involved. Ideally, a
good control and information system will preclude such an event.
Since the Repair Officer is responsible for all work and since the a-
bove scheme calls for Droblems to be keyed at the foreman level, he needs
other information to check work status. There are necessarily (for adminis-
trative purposes if nothing else) several management levels between the
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Repair Officer and the foreman, and even the best system will likely mal-
function due to human frailties. In order to check expenditures and time-
liness of completion, a good decision-oriented system will indicate to the
Repair Officer when and where a problem exists.
Not all problems to be solved require rescheduling. Faulty or missing
material and design assistance required are just two examples of problems
which potentially can be solved in the time alloted and with available re-
sources. The control system must allow that this information be made avail-
able to the right persons early enough to allow action be taken to prevent
serious problems from developing. The foreman will be involved in such sit-
uations. This is the dispatching function discussed earlier. The Repair
Officer will also be involved, but it should only be in those situations
which will jeopardize completions and increased expenditures.
Frorr. the above, it is seen that an information system which highlights
problems that jeopardize overall schedule completions and/or over expendi-
tures is desirable for the purposes of rescheduling, assigning material
priorities for acquisition, obtaining design aid and many other activities.
It must supply the appropriate information to the proper manager. It must
not supply too much information--the stacked desk problem- -or it won't be
used. It is not. the purpose of the normative model to establish what that
information is at each level, but rather to indicate the type and purpose.
The details will be developed later.
All three of the managers will be interested in performance criteria.
If properly chosen and utilized, they can indicate where more management at-
tention and resources should be expended. They should highlight problems
and aid in solving them, and thus contribute to the productive effort.
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There are other decisions which must be made and which are not re-
lateable to the job shop model. They are technical, administrative, human
relations, etc. These will be observed and categorized but little attempt
has been made to make normative statements about them other than for our
purposes they are important only where they affected the main efforts of
the Production Department.
C. The Descriptive Model of the Production Department
Having provided the reader with our normative model, we now move to the
descriptive model of the shipyard Production Department decision processes
and environment. The observations and subsequent construction of the descrip-
tive model which follow must be recognized as being incomplete. This condi-
tion was dictated by the paucity of time and manpower available to us. How-
ever, by using our own knowledge gained from construction of the normative
model, and the model itself, we have hoped that utilization of the resources
available to us has been nearly maximized. In the construction of the de-
scriptive model, attempts have been made to minimize needless duplication of
material presented in Chapter III, but some repetition was necessary to em-
phasize certain key points. Throughout the observation and descriptive
modelling processes , we have attempted to keep decision making and decision-
related subjects the focal point of our attention.
As discussed in Chapter II, the observation period covered approxi-
mately four weeks
, and utilized the data collection form shown in Figure
II-6. During the first two weeks, each of us observed two foremen. These
foremen were in the mechanical and electrical/electronics areas, and in-
cluded both those whose primary work was aboard ship and those whose work
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was of a nature that piece work was brought to them for accomplishment in a
central shop. The Repair Officer and Production Officer were each observed
by both authors for a period of one week.
Upon completion of each segment of the observation period, the recorded
data was subject to analysis in order to determine the type of decisions
made, the frequency of these decision types, and their relative importance
for each of the three levels of Production Department we observed. In sec-
tions to follow, results of this analysis are displayed and discussed. It
is to be noted that the categorization and labeling of the types of decisions
made is somewhat arbitrary and not always clear cut.




Analysis and categorization of the decisions made by the






Coordination (with other shops)
Administration
By far the most important of these decision areas is technical and control .
Of all line and staff managers , the foreman is in the unique position of
both (1) having a wealth of job-related experience and knowledge, and (2)
being in a position to directly and daily translate that knowledge into ac-
tion. Others possess one of these capabilities but not both. He is con-
tinually faced with the problems (requiring decisions) associated with
direct supervision of 15-4C mechanics and observation of their work. A
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host of technically-based situations requiring decisions arise including:
1.) Technical difficulties on seemingly straightforward jobs;
2.) Interpretation of plans, standards and written procedures;
3.) Validation of the scope of the actual task as opposed to
what the job order says;
4.) Progressing the job/overhaul--where do we stand?
5.) Notification of higher authority when a problem situation
is evident;
6.) Determination of repair parts needed to accomplish the
job;
7.) Determination of when to close out a "key operation"
(KEYOP) (a job order or major delineable work task is
usually broken down into five to ten KEYOPS; see Chapter
III).
Technically-oriented decisions and supervision consume better than half the
first -line supervisor's time.
In supporting his technical decisions, the foreman utilizes several
sources: plans and blueprints, technical manuals, job orders, milestone
schedules (described in more detail later), planners, and his own general
knowledge and judgement. This latter constitutes his most frequently used
information source, and it is difficult to envision its total replacement
by any mechanized methods.
Much of the foreman's time is spent "on the job" providing solutions
to technical difficulties on seemingly straightforward jobs; for example,
heat exchanger tubes that have become "frozen" in place and cannot be re-
moved by normal procedures. Most mechanics cannot be relied upon to take
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appropriate action on their own without further complicating the problem.
Many young mechanics may not have had the experience of seeing the particu-
lar problem before, and, are therefore unsure of the appropriate solution.
Instructions for the performance of technical tasks are provided to the
worker in a variety of forms: plans, written procedures, etc. Often these
instructions are of a general nature, which is understandable because it may
well be too complicated or expensive to provide exact, detailed instructions
for each task. Thus, the foreman must act as an interpreter of these in-
structions, supplying the additional specific instructions as required. He
is a very appropriate person for this task, since he possesses a detailed
knowledge of the specific job, the available instructions for performing the
job, and a wealth of technical experience.
Because the planner cannot always physically sight each repair job (in
this case he is formulating the job order based on a written description of
the deficiency), and also because the extent of some problems cannot be de-
termined until the equipment is actually disassembled as part of the repair
procedure, job orders as first written do not always reflect the work that
needs to be done. The foreman is the liaison or waterfront representative
who must decide if the job order as written describes the task at hand. If.
in his opinion it does not, he submits a request for revision of the job
order. Since this decision is subjective, it is reviewed by higher manage-
ment in the Planning Department.
The foreman is also in a position to render effective judgement in de-
termining the parts required for equipment repairs. He can physically see
the work in question, apply his experience to the mechanic's request for
parts and pass the request to planning for action. He should thus be able
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to weight the costs of repair or replacement.
Perhaps the most nagging problems to both the foreman and higher level
management are the related problems of: (1) What is the progress or status
of the job at any instant in
' time
,
and how is this expressed; and (2) When
is a major problem situation present, and what prior action can be taken to
prevent minor difficulties from becoming major problems. The general ap-
proach by the foreman to these questions is to make a decision based largely
on his experience. Although there may exist more sophisticated approaches,
it is probably fair to say that the foreman's is very appropriate and usual-
ly reliable.
Many foremen are reluctant to close KEYOPS until after equipment opera-
tional checkout, which may occur at a significantly later date than the com-
pletion of the work effort on the KEYOP. The rationale employed is that if
a problem develops during testing, the foreman needs a KEYOP against which
to charge the rework. This was not the intent of the MIS designers who en-
visioned KEYOP completion as a progress indicator. Although the foreman is
supposed to indicate completion of KEYOPS, the MIS allows anyone to do so
and this is often accomplished by the Production Control Branch for KEYOPS
associated with milestone completion.
The formally promulgated (via job order and various MIS reports) start
and completion times of jobs and KEYOPS are seldom, if ever, adhered to by
the foreman. This is caused by a variety of reasons including delays in ma-
terial receipt, problem areas arising on jobs previously thought to be rou-
tine, delays in receipt of plans, emphasis on milestone versus KEYOPS manage-
ment, etc. The foreman does adhere to the broader based but less flexible
milestone schedule which is discussed in a following section and the general

-83-
routing sequence which is promulgated in the job order brief published by
the Planning Department.
The dispatching priority most frequently utilized by the foreman is
the shortest due date. Some foremen consider the assignment of overtime
to a job an additional indicator of the desired priority of higher manage-
ment, though this is not its intended purpose (see the discussion of over-
time policy in a following section).
In the technical area, and others as well, it must be kept in mind
that the foreman may not have the complete picture or perspective, and thus
his judgement and decisions must be reviewed by others, but it is vital that
he be encouraged to communicate effectively with higher-level management.
In our observations, this was not always the case! The significance of this
is obvious; if a man thinks he is being listened to and he is contributing,
his morale, productivity, etc. will rise, and quite the opposite will occur
if he is not
.
Cost charging decisions , although they do not take nearly as much time
to accomplish as technical, have a significant impact on shipyard operations.
Cost charging allocates direct labor to specific job orders, and thus, when
summarized, forms a key input to the determination of the cost of an over-
haul. The comparison of actual expenditures versus the amount allowed by
standards forms one of two criteria used in the Performance Measurement Ap-
plication of the MIS.
It is the stated philosophy of higher level management that the foreman
charge the job honestly; i.e., report via the mechanic's timecard the actual
number of man hours it takes to accomplish a given KEYOP. However, it is
clearly evident that the typical yard foreman is very conscious of whether
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he has exceeded the KEYOP allowance. Individual foremen use a variety of
time consuming mechanisms to accomplish this. Where a significant overrun
is evident, the foreman usually submits a "revision request" to extend the
allowance. Since revision requests are intended for a change in scope of
the job only (i.e., five valves need repair instead of the original estimate
of three), many of these requests are turned down. Since the Performance
Measurement Application computes performance on a percentage over (under) al-
lowance, even where the overrun is small, there is motivation to charge to
the large KEYOPS . One very rarely finds a KEYOP which has been under-
expended. The effort put forth by the foreman in accomplishing cost charg-
ing is to a large extent unnecessary, and detracts from his primary job. In
keeping track of actual expenditures , the foreman usually updates one of
several periodic MIS reports on a daily basis or utilizes a separate card
file system or a "black book." In some cases, almost a full hour each day-
was utilized for this useless record keeping.
The current system does not allow the foreman to charge clearly ob-
viously overhead work (such as receipt, handling and processing of repair
parts belonging to several job orders) to an overhead account. As a result,
we observed numerous examples of overhead work being charged to direct labor.
Material decisions form an area where the foreman plays a limited role,
yet their impact on the actual accomplishment of work is great. If the re-
quired parts are not available, work may be delayed and the ultimate overhaul
completion date may be affected in extreme cases. In making many technical
decisions, the foreman must know the availability and status of repair parts,
and in the determination of whether a part is critically needed, significant
technical knowledge is involved. This demonstrates the large amount of
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interplay between these two decision areas. The foreman is called upon to
determine which parts are required to accomplish a job and whether a part
is critically needed; i.e., whether a delay in its receipt will affect the
completion date of the job. 'Once this information is passed to higher au-
thority, the foreman's role is largely passive; the most he can do is re-
iterate the importance of particular parts in meeting the schedule, and
their impact downstream in the overhaul. The foreman obtains material in-
formation from the shop planner who largely utilizes standard and local MIS
reports
.
Relations with other shops and decisions associated with coordination
are handled in a variety of ways, depending on the management style of the
foreman. Each job order consists of a number of KEYOPS , and similarly each
KEYOP is composed of a number of v/ork instructions (called Line Items) as-
signed directly to individual shops. The shop in whose area the job order
principally lies is designated the "lead shop," and in a similar manner,
the "key shop" is designated at the KEYOP level. It is the stated responsi-
bility of each of these designated lead or key shops to ensure that listed
assist shops accomplish their work in a timely fashion. The method most,
commonly used to accomplish this coordination is informal verbal communica-
tions. It is clear that tact and skill in manipulating people are essential
requirements for successful accomplishment of this task.
The category of administrative decisions is in a sense of a catch-all
nature. Administrative decisions include those associated with leave, train-
ing, special requests, mechanic evaluations, and the like. Some five to ten
percent of the foreman's time is involved in this area which, though it
directly detracts from his primary task of on-the-job supervision, certainly
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has an indirect affect on the production effort. He must attempt to keep
his people happy, yet get the job done.
In some instances, the foreman is called upon to handle situations
in which he is not particularly well qualified. An example of this is the
handling of drunkenness on the job. Although professional help and formal
mechanisms exist for handling extreme and chronic offenders, the foreman
must expend some effort in counselling and deciding how best to handle the
occasional offender.
In making administrative decisions, the foreman utilizes several in-
formational sources including personal contact and a variety of shipyard
instructions and regulations.
A brief summary of the classification of the major decisions made by
the foreman is shown in Figure IV-1. Descriptive information flow diagrams
relating to this are shown in Figures IV-2 and IV-3.
Adequacy of Supporting Information
The foreman uses a variety of types of information in making his deci-
sions and these are listed in Figure IV-4. In general his informational
support is adequate except in the following areas:
Scheduling : As mentioned, the foreman does not usually follow the job/
KEYOP start/complete dates as promulgated. Static KEYOP schedules soon fall
into disuse and dynamic scheduling is of a partial nature. Milestone sched-
ules are followed and rescheduled when missed, but not all jobs/KEYOPS af-
fected are likewise rescheduled. Dynamic scheduling is of particular im-
portance in analyzing downstream impact of missed milestones.
Priority of Work : This area is in need of some greater degree of for-
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what turned out to be erroneous possible indicators such as allocation (or
the lack of it) of overtime. A clear, periodic statement or restatement of
priority ships and jobs is needed and its dissemination must reach the fore-
man .
Technical (Communication) : The communication link between the planner
and the foreman formally exists, but frequently proves unsatisfactory for a
variety of reasons, most of them related to personalities. As a result,
many foremen disregard the planner and his potentially valuable technical
contribution, and other foremen decide to do things the way the planner
wants without interjecting their own expertise; this can prove detrimental
if the planner never gets to physically look at the job.
Control System : A better way of progressing jobs /overhauls is needed.
Establishment of a formal dispatching rule might prove beneficial. The fore-
man must indicate completion of tasks to higher management in a timely man-
ner so that proper control can be exercised from that level.
Cost Charging : Few additional words need to be said about this area.
The foreman is spending too much time maintaining hand-kept records he
thinks are necessary in view of performance measurement criteria and what
he believes higher management wants him to do.
Material : The foreman must now get all his material status from the
shop planner. Although he certainly cannot practically utilize material
status on all repair parts on a regular basis, it might prove beneficial
to provide him current status on critical material on a nearly daily basis.
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b. ) The Repair Officer
Analysis of the Repair Officer's decisions during the







Since the primary job of the Repair Officer is to ensure that the overhaul
or conversion is accomplished in a timely fashion, it is not surprising that
decisions relating to overhaul strategy/control rank highest in importance.
The Repair Officer is vitally interested in the status of major jobs in the
overhaul and adherence to the milestone schedule, even more so than the
foreman, who in addition must worry about the manifold details of getting
the work done. A key decision that the Repair Officer must make involves
determining what are current and potential major problem areas. The Repair
Officer cannot afford to respond to many crisis situations after-the-fact.
Their occurrence cannot be totally avoided, but he must constantly be on the
lookout for potential crises before they happen. As in the case of the fore-
man, the questions of how to express job status and the determination of
whether it is satisfactory must be answered. This is the area of control
which is discussed in a following section.
Another decision of importance involves the determination of strategy
and priority. Once determined, this must reach down to the foreman level
if it is to be effective. The key jobs on the "hot" ships must continually
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be reviewed and understood by the shop hierarchy. During our observations,
this was not always accomplished.
The decision of how best to coordinate his efforts with the Ship
Management Officer (SMO) (when such a billet is utilized for the management
of a specific complex or large project, overhaul or conversion) must be
made by the Repair Officer. Though his responsibilities are broadly de-
lineated in Shipyard Regulations
,
in practice the performance of the task
depends largely on the personality and management style of the appointee.
Information sources used in the development of overhaul strategy are
numerous. The Assistant Repair Superintendents and Ship Superintendents are
the Repair Officer's prime suppliers of status information and contribute
significantly to the problem- finding effort. Generation of the "Production
Officer's Weekly Status Summary" (discussed in detail in a following sec-
tion) causes considerable effort to be expended and probing questions to be
asked in these areas. The availability schedule (a bar- type chart depicting
the availabilities of ships currently in the yard and those due to arrive in
the near future) and the milestone schedule are relied upon heavily for the
development of overhaul strategy. Finally, the Repair Officer must rely
significantly on his experience in accomplishment of this task.
The Repair Officer is deeply involved in human resource management . He
must make decisions on a variety of related subjects including: coordination
and resolution of problems among the shops; allocation of overtime; determi-
nation of whether outside contractors should be brought into the yard for
specific jobs; comparison of actual manning versus forecasted and determi-
nation of consistency with overhaul priorities; determination of whether to
complete minor work items at another facility (Newport, R. I., for example,
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the homeport for many ships overhauled at Boston); evaluation of requested
borrows /loans
.
Although both the Repair Officer and the group superintendents (see
Chapter III for a description of the Group Superintendent) formally report
to the Production Officer, there is a significant interaction between
them. Many problems can be resolved via this means of communication and
thus eliminate the need to expose the Production Officer to matters that
can be resolved at a lower level. It was our observation that the Repair
Officer usually approached the group superintendents on these matters,
rather than vice versa.
At the present time, overtime management in naval shipyards is a matter
under the direct control of the shipyard commanders. As part of an effort
to improve productivity and reduce costs, this has been directed by higher
authority in Washington. In Boston, the overtime requests originate in the
shops, and go through the group superintendents to the Repair Officer. The
Repair Officer considers each request and determines the necessity for ap-
proval. He then confers with the Shipyard Commander who makes the final ap-
proval decision. In order that the Repair Officer be able to make rational
recommendations, he must be well informed on the critical! ty of the re-
quested work for maintaining the ship on its schedule and the extent to
which the schedule will be jeopardized if the work is delayed. If the over-
time is requested because limited facilities are in high demand, he must
know what those demands are and how critical meeting their schedules are.
He needs information en skills and manning levels. In order to stay within




When control of overtime was first made a direct task of the Shipyard
Commander, the Repair Officer was confronted with decision of how to best
determine which requests were valid. Some shops quickly adhered to the
newer approach toward careful use of overtime. Others continued to ask for
unnecessary amounts. In some cases, employees were accustomed to regular
overtime and the cutback caused serious problems in their personal financial
situations. Once the policy was enforced, a new problem developed. Some
shop heads decided their requests would be turned down, even if valid, and
they stopped requesting overtime. The Repair Officer then had to be alert
to the situation where overtime was needed but not requested. One tool
which can be utilized to help detect such situations is comparing the work
load forecast with expenditures and manning levels by ship. If the expend-
itures lag the forecast, a problem may be developing. Other sources of in-
formation are the same as used in the normal control process. Administer-
ing this function requires that the Repair Officer be up to date on all
projects
.
Not uncommonly, the Repair Officer was called upon to pass judgement
on requests to bring an outside contractor into the yard to perform work.
These requests were submitted either because the yard resources in a par-
ticular specialty area were fully utilized or because the customer thought
he might be able to get more for his money from an outside contractor in a
specialty area (the example we observed involved habitability work). Before
a decision is made, the Repair Officer must first examine the impact on the
shipyard workforce, and specifically possible action that the shipyard labor
unions may take. In this area, the Repair Officer relies heavily on the




Occasionally the customer will request that a ship leave the yard on
a specific date which would alJow nearly all of the work package to be com-
pleted at normal manning rates , but leave some outstanding work to be accom-
plished. The Repair Officer must decide whether it is more advantageous to
increase manning or send workers to the ship's homeport (usually Newport,
R.I.).
The first two decision categories are clearly the most important. The
remaining three, technical, work acceptance and customer relations are of
lesser importance , and a distinguishing of relative importance among them
is both difficult and unnecessary.
The Repair Officer's technical decisions are largely supportive of the
overhaul strategy and human resource management areas. He reviews and com-
ments on unusual procedures and arbitrates disputes involving differences
of opinion between the shops and the Planning Department concerning important
technical matters. He ensures that the ship superintendents and assistant
repair officers are on top of technical problems by asking probing questions,
and he passes technical judgement on their recommendations. In most cases,
he is the final authority on resolution of delinquency reports; this may in-
volve both technical and managerial considerations.
The remaining two decision areas closely involve the Planning Depart-
ment. Additional work acceptance concerns either a determination of whether
work requested by the ship/customer is within the original contract (not as
easy as it might at first seem), or whether (1) additional work requested
for a ship already in the yard, or (2) acceptance of a new ship will delay
ship completions. Customer relations involves impacts of these decisions on
the customer and a determination of the position the yard will take in light
of possible customer reactions.
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Purposely not mentioned above in the discussion of information sources
is the role of the Production Control Branch. It is not an exaggeration to
state that the Production Control Officer is the Repair Officer's single
most important informational' source
. His office handles three key variables
of overhaul management—scheduling, workload forecasting, and progressing.
These are in fact close to the titles of the three sections in the Produc-
tion Control Branch (the only exception is the Work Status Section, whose
primary task is workload forecasting):
Work Status— accomplishes work load forecasting using historical
data and interaction with the Planning Department and shipyard
MIS; compares present forecasted manning in order to find prob-
lem areas; works on simulation-related problems such as the affect
of adding/deleting a ship to the overhaul schedule. This section
accomplishes advance planning for the Production Department.
Scheduling- -accomplishes the static and dynamic scheduling for
the department. It is this section that establishes the start/
completion dates on all job orders prior to issuance, based on
job routing information from the Planning Department (static
scheduling). Dynamic scheduling is accomplished for (1) approved
revision requests, (2) changes in milestone schedules; i.e., dy-
namic scheduling is not accomplished for single missed KEYOPS or
j ob orde rs .




A brief summary of the classification of the major decisions made
by the Repair Officer is shown in Figure IV- 5. Descriptive information
flow diagrams relating to this are shown in Figures IV-6 and IV-7.
Adequacy of Supporting Information
The types of information used by the Repair Officer are listed in
Figure IV-8. The degree of support was felt to be adequate except in the
areas of work load forecasting and job status support.
Job Status : Since the Repair Officer's prime task is one of control
and development of an effective overhaul strategy, he must have accurate
job status information. Identification of key status parameters and obtain-
ing reliable values for them is of great importance and in need of improve-
ment. As an example, if the foreman does not charge direct labor to the
proper job, and indicate timely completion of tasks, related indices of
progress are useless to higher management.
Work Load Forecasting : The Repair Officer's interest in work load
forecasting is of lesser magnitude than that of the Production Officer,
but still significant. His time frame for forecasting and predicted man-
ning involves a closer horizon, and his main uses of the information are:
(1) to decide if adequate manning is being spent on a ship; (2) to in-
vestigate inter-ship downstream impacts of increased manning; and (3) to
determine impacts of increased job acceptance. Increased reliability of
predicted manning .curves needs to be developed in order for work load fore-
casting to become a better tool for indicating job status which in turn
determines overhaul strategy.
c . ) The Production Officer
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is the highest level of management involved in the direct production effort.
His involvement in this effort is thus of a more general nature than either
the Repair Officer or the Foreman. An analysis of decision areas involving
the Production Officer will therefore yield categorizations broader in
scope; these include:








Workload forecasting and human resource management are the most im-
portant decision areas and are considered jointly for the Production Officer
because of their close interaction at his level of management. As does the
Repair Officer, he depends to a large extent on the Production Control
Branch for' informational support in this advance planning area. The re-
quirements of the present and projected ship overhaul schedule (obtained
from the Planning Department) are overlayed on the current yard workforce,
and delineate possible hire/fire actions unless deletions /additions to the
work schedule are made. Hire/fire decisions in a naval shipyard are non-
trivial matters. Most x^orkmen are at least semi-skilled, and several
trades employ skills rarely found elsewhere. In addition, reductions in
force (and there have been several in the last few years as the shipyards
have declined in workrorce numbers) nave a significant affect on workers
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remaining in the yard. Thus hire/fire decisions require that significant
planning effort be expended.
If hire/fire decisions appear to be a likelihood, the Administrative
Officer (a civilian with lengthy experience in union /personnel matters) is
first consulted. Although the unions in a government shipyard are forbid-
den to strike, the effects of action taken without proper consideration of
union involvement would be readily discern able in the form of decreased
productivity and the like.
As the shipyards grow smaller in workforce size, it is anticipated
that decisions related to inter-yard and intra-yard borrows/loans will be-
come more important. When unscheduled events such as fires/collisions occur
to high priority ships such as aircraft carriers or Polaris submarines, the
scope of the work and the shortness of the desired repair time are often
such that one yard alone cannot handle the additional burden, however, the
shipyards working in concert can. Such a combined effort requires coordina-
tion and thorough planning to ensure that the high priority work is accom-
plished on time without unduly disturbing routinely scheduled work.
An example demonstrating the need for improved resources management
occurred during our observation period. As mentioned previously, the age
of the average shipyard employee is higher then that found in most firms,
and many now qualify for retirement benefits. The way existing benefit
statutes are written, it was advantageous for many of the retirees to leave
before the end of the fiscal year 1972. However, these people were not re-
quired to inform management of their intentions long enough ahead of time
so that adequate planning could be initiated to start corrective action.
We were told that the same problem had occurred the previous year.
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In the area of overhaul strategy /control
, the Production Officer, al-
though always involved in a general way , is involved directly only when ex-
ceptional situations are present. Ideally, it is the Repair Officer's task
to accomplish the productive work effort, but problems arise which must be
resolved on a higher level. The Production Officer provides the link be-
tween the shops and work load forecasting/human resources management. Ad-
ditionally, the Production Officer briefs the Shipyard Commander on matters
concerning overhaul status and problem areas.
Again, the decision of what constitutes satisfactory work progress
arises. Improvement seems to be needed in the area of problem finding and
recognition, especially when large or complex overhauls /con vers ions are in-
volved. During our observation period, the two most significant problems in-
volved large (four- and ten-million dollar), lengthy (six- to ten-month)
overhauls of non-destroyer type ships. It seems that special, more formal,
and perhaps strictly enforced control procedures are necessary in these cir-
cumstances. Once a problem is thought to exist, decision-oriented tools for
investigating its validity and providing alternative solutions must be em-
ployed expeditiously.
Productivity is a decision area in which the Production Officer has al-
ways been involved, but one which is being formally re-emphasized as part
of a governmental attack on the problem facing the nation. During our ob-
servation period, a program calling for monthly reporting (to Washington) of
productivity improvement by the naval shipyards was instituted. The selec-
tion of indices used to measure productivity and the generation and imple-
mentation of methods to improve performance in this area are very difficult
que5;tions to answer. It appears that an increasing amount of the Production
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Officer's time will be devoted to this category of decisions.
It might appear at first that the subject of methods and standards
is simply disposed of. However, the determination of obtainable, yet de-
manding, environmentally adjusted (for example outside work in the winter/
summer), popularly accepted standards on which to base work expenditure al-
lowances is not so easy. As mentioned previously, the Performance Measure-
ment Application of the standard MIS utilizes the adherence to allowance
as an input, which leads to current cost charging practices. The Production
Officer relies heavily on the Production Engineering Officer for information
in this area. Through this office, attempts are made to standardize work
methods and procedures among the ten naval shipyards to provide a means of
comparison and more nearly uniform product output.
Plant facilities and budget-related decisions are similar in that they
both are periodic decisions requiring substantial prior planning. A special
Shipyard Modernization and Facilities Planning Board, of which the Produc-
tion Officer is currently chairman, makes recommendations for plant improve-
ments and major repairs based on current and future needs and the strategy
for shipyard development. The Production Engineering Officer is also the
Production Officer's assistant in this area. The budget problem is one of
classic nature; the Administrative Officer has a small staff which handles
most of this work for the department. It was interesting to observe that
these people kept a close watch on the production shops to keep overhead
charges to a minimum, including charging some overhead-related items to
direct labor, if necessary. This 5s fine if you want to keep overhead costs
down, but it does not reflect true labor charges, makes analysis more diffi-
cult, and is net generally accepted as gcod practice.
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Safety needs little discussion. It is trite, but true, to say that
safety is everyone's problem. The Production Officer is formally charged
with safety responsibility for the shipyard, and has an assistant whose
sole responsibility is this area. Occasionally some new and interesting
safety-related subjects occur; while we were at the shipyard, approximately
15-20 legal claims against the shipyard for long-term audio damage were
filed by current or recent shipyard employees. Hearing losses resulting
from a noisy environment is becoming a serious problem to industry in gener-
al, and not just the naval shipyards. A practical solution to the problem
is not clearly evident, and much work remains to be done before a decision
regarding rectification of this problem area can be made.
Personnel evaluation is a decision area in which we did not personally
observe the Production Officer, but which was pointed out to us as an im-
portant and time-consuming one for him. The Production Officer is responsi-
ble for the evaluation of all military officers and many key civilian super-
visors assigned to the department, and takes an active part in the prepara-
tion of these reports. In this decision area, the Production Ofiicer must
have an in-depth knowledge of relevant command policy and the implications
of his evaluation on future job performance.
A brief summary of the classification of the major decisions made by
the Production Officer is shown in Figure IV-9. Descriptive information
flow diagrams relating to this are shown in Figures IV-10 and IV-11.
Types of information on which the Production Officer bases his deci-
sions are shown in Figure IV-12. In general, he is adequately supported,
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Job Status : Comments on job status for the Production Officer are
similar to those for the Repair Officer.
Work Load Forecasting : Accurate work load forecasting information is
essential to the Production Officer and his staff. Without it, he cannot
make meaningful decisions concerning work acceptance, hire/fire, effective
manpower coordination between shops and shipyards, etc.
Work Standards : The use of work standards as a management tool is a
subject for debate by students of management science and will not be disputed
here. If, however, one accepts that standards are in fact to be used, they
must be relevant and up-to-date. Cost standards currently in use are ripe
for review and validation if not change.
Plant Facilities : The Production Officer needs a method of reviewing
or validating priority recommendations cf the Modernization and Facilities
Planning Board. Capital investment decision tools such as net present value
should be employed in conjunction with other techniques.
2 . Decision-Related Observation s
In addition to directly observing three levels of management
in the Production Department, we were also in a position to see how methods
were utilized to accomplish and monitor shipyard work . Two of the more
interesting and relevant to decision making were the production control sys-
tem and the use of the current shipyard MIS. These are discussed in follow-
ing sections.
a. ) Control
Control of productive work at Boston Naval Shipyard is
interesting to observe. There are three major documents which are impor-
tant--the job order, the milestone schedule, and the delinquency report.
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The job order has been discussed earlier and an example is exhibited in
Appendix A.
The milestone schedule is promulgated for each ship availability.
Milestones are key events to which job order and KEYOP completions are
tied. Examples of milestones are docking and undocking, dock trials, sea
trials, etc. A sample schedule is shown in Appendix A. A typical destroy-
er overhaul will have 20 to 30 milestones schedules. Each milestone has a
milestone manager at the shop or group superintendent level who is responsi-
ble for ensuring completion as scheduled. Although each KEYOP on every job
order is tied to a milestone (labeled KEVENT on the job order), there is no
document which tells the milestone manager what all the relevent KEYOPS are
for his milestone. He currently relies on his experience and ability, and
on the experience of the general foreman and foreman to progress the work
and report any problems. If a problem develops which will jeopardize the
milestone on-time completion, a delinquency report (DR) which describes the
problem is submitted. The method of handling the DR will depend on the
type of problem—material, technical, work load, etc. Those problems which
cannot be resolved at lower levels go to the Repair Officer. He obtains as
much information as he can from the assistant repair superintendents , Group
Superintendent, Production Control Branch, etc., to evaluate and determine
the appropriate action. He will attempt to hold to the milestone date if
possible. If not, a rescheduling of that date, but not of overhaul comple-
tion date is tried. If the only solution is to reschedule and delay comple-
tion, the Production Officer becomes involved. If the system works properly,
the latter will be an infrequent occurrence, except where significant techni-
cal or other problems develop.
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The main thrust of the above part of the production control effort is
through the civilian "line" organization of the Production Department. It
can be seen in Figure II 1-2 that the group superintendents do not report to
the Repair Officer. He is responsible, however, for overall management up
to the point that unsolvable delays occur. Thus, the effectiveness of this
part of the system heavily depends on the personal relations between the
four group superintendents and the Repair Officer.
The other major thrust at managing the productive effort is at the
Ship Superintendent level. Ship superintendents are relatively junior naval
officers with a wide variance of experience in the overhaul and repair of
naval ships. Their responsibilities are:
1. Meeting the ship on arrival, seeing that necessary services
are provided, calling on the Commanding Officer and heads of de-
partments, and establishing liaison with the ship.
2. Inspecting and coordinating the work of his ship to the end
that completion of individual jobs and the entire availability
shall meet approved schedules; coordinating shipyard and ship's
force work
.
3. Advising and assisting senior trade supervisors assigned to
his ship; recommending corrective action when, in his opinion, the
numbers or distribution cf men assigned his ship are dispro-
portionate to the task, or when the utilization or industry of
the men is deficient.
4. Ensuring that safe practices are followed in the performance
of all work on his ship to the end that casualties to personnel,
ships, systems and equipment do not occur; being personally
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present for critical events in his ship's availability.
5. Expediting the flow of material to ensure quality and
progress is compatible with completion dates.
6. Notifying higher authority immediately whenever he believes
that any schedule is jeopardized by factors beyond his control,
and when work instructions or plans appear to be in error or when
they may be improved.
7. Ensuring that only authorized work is undertaken.
8. Ensuring prompt connecting, disconnecting, and reconnection
of services when the ship arrives or is shifted on the waterfront;
supervising those preparations for departure for which the Pro-
duction Department is responsible; and assisting in the timely
completion of the ship's preparations for sea.
9. Performing the duties of Ship Safety Officer for his ship
when so disignated.
As a matter of good practice, a Ship Superintendent will deal
directly with the senior supervisors of the several trades or shops as-
signed to the ship(s) for which he is responsible, coordinating and as-
sisting them in xheir relations with other trades, with other shipyard ac-
tivities and with the ship's force. He shall take direct action with per-
sonnel below the level of the senior supervisor assigned to his ship(s)
only when such action is immediately necessary to prevent or correct er-
rors, for reasons of safety, or in emergencies; and he shall in such in-
stances inform the senior supervisor as soon as practical of the action he
has taken.
It is seen that they have no line authority delegated except in
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einergencies. Their effectiveness will therefore depend on their experience
and their ability to work with foremen and general foremen, and occasional-
ly with the shop or group heads. To aid the Ship Superintendent there is a
civilian counterpart--a progressman--assigned to him. The progressmen have
usually had significant yard experience, but their individual abilities
vary significantly. The Ship Superintendent performs much as a project
manager without authority. However, there is always access to the Repair Of-
ficer via the Assistant Repair Officers to resolve problems not taken care of
at lower levels. Additionally, there is a weekly meeting of all Ship Super-
intendents and Assistant Repair Officers with the Repair Officer. This meet-
ing is the start of the preparation of the Production Officer's Status Sum-
mary described later in this section.
There are several MIS reports which are thought by some in the shipyard
to be of help in locating problems and in aiding the above control scheme.
None of the three levels of managers that we observed ever used any of these
documents directly to aid him in making a decision. In some instances,
there was MIS information presented to them in summary format that had been
prepared and "massaged" by staff personnel.
The Production Officer's Status Summary is the key document used for
control and progressing of work by higher level Production Deparrment manag-
ers. Every Monday, each Ship Superintendent and Assistant Repair Officer
prepares a summary of the status of the ship for which he is responsible.
A sample is shown in Appendix A. This is reviewed at the afternoon meeting
with the Repair Officer. During the remainder of the week, there are vari-
ous meetings with the Group Superintendents, Production Department staff,
Production Officer, representatives of other departments, etc., at which
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the information is updated and problems are discussed. The summary sheets
provide the focal point of discussion. By Thursday morning, they are up-
dated and the. Production Officer utilizes them in a personal briefing of
the Shipyard Commander on the status of the productive work. It is to be
noted that some of the data used in this report is obtained from the cur-
rent MIS.
One other document is utilized. If there is a change in the scope of
work to be performed (as discussed in the section on the Foreman), a "revi-
sion request" is submitted by the shop to the Planning Department. If ap-
proved, the job is reissued and rescheduled.
The value of the above system is that it focuses the attention of each
key manager on each project for which he has some responsibility. The rou-
tine meetings bring them together to discuss and solve problems. The system
works and for the past two and a half years has worked well. Prior to that.
time, Boston had experienced problems with on-time delivery. The milestone
system with the emphasis on lower-level management experience was implemented
and the record since has been that no delays have occurred except where re-
quired by an increase in the scope of the work contracted for with the cus-
tomer. At the time the new system was started, there was also a change in
key Production Department personnel. We heard many opinions on which of
these two was most influential in improving delivery performance. Our opin-
ion was that some of both was important
..
More discussion of the milestone
method and ways to improve it will be discussed later. At the current time
there are some ship projects in the yard in jeopardy of being delayed.
This control system functions to keep work on schedule. The cost as-
pect is monitored by the type desk officers in the Planning Department. if

-120-
problerns occur, the Repair Officer is consulted and the problem is formally
addressed. In practice, if all work in the yard is on schedule, the work
force is at a proper level, and a ship completes on time without the use of
excessive overtime (which is
. charged to the project actually worked on),
there should be no reason for large variances of actual cost from predicted
cost.
The control system is very dependent on the expertise of the first -line
supervisors. As long as the ship type is familiar and the overhaul is rou-
tine, the system should continue to work. As discussed in more detail later,
when there are unusual overhauls or extended conversions, it does not func-
tion as well.
The system characteristics and performance record are highly dependent
on the individuals involved at all management levels. This will be true of
any system in the complex operation involved in the shipyard. The best any
information system can hope to do is to provide some objective information
for the individuals to utilize.
b. ) Usage of Current Shipyard MIS in the Production Department
The current usage of the MIS within the Production Depart-
ment by responsible line and staff managers is discouragingly low. There are
three major areas where it is used by managers other than the three we stud-
ied. These are described below.
The work load forecasting application is heavily used in the Work Status
Section of the Production Control Branch. This is the key point in the yard
where the c urrent status is compared with future work to attempt to balance
the work load. In actuality, the head of this section normally deals direct-
ly with Lhe Planning Department for purposes of determining the impact of

-121-
accepting new work. The section also maintains curves and data which help
the Production Control Officer, the Repair Officer and the Production Of-
ficer in evaluating ihe status of current work loads. This data is main-
tained by shop and by ship or project. It helps in determining how far
ahead/behind a project is and how over /under loaded particular shops are.
The basic type of information compares forecasted loads against expenditures.
It is updated so that if scheduled work is not completed, it is reallocated
to the time left for the project. The main MIS application utilized is the
Work Load Forecasting Application plus some locally (Boston only) developed
outputs which utilize the MIS data base. This application is extremely good
and has a lot of flexibility. However, it is limited in usefulness for two
main reasons. As already stated, the value of the information comes from
comparing expenditures to forecasts and both of these pieces of data cur-
rently have problems which make them less than precise.
Expenditure information comes from time charging. As previously
stated, the Foreman has pressures exerted which cause him to charge less
than 100% accurately. If the work has been performed, but by a different
shop or shop work center than scheduled, it is not recognized. Additionally,
if a job order/KEYOP is not closed out on schedule, and they seldom are (the
shops hold them open as "protection" if future work in that area develops),
the job then appears as a "backlog," when in fact most if not all work has
been performed. There are also problems with the forecast. It is based on
work load forecast data supplied to the computer. Each project has a curve
prepared and maintained by the Work Status Section. The major source of
their information is historical. At the current time, this data is recorded
and maintained manually in the section. There arc nominally nine or ten
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persons in this section and only two of them are free to perform any analytic
work--the others maintain and update data. Consequently, the determination
and the updating of the work load forecast curves for each project is per-
formed by the two analysts, one of whom is the section head.
The second area is in material control. There is a committee with
representatives from each line department which meets daily to take care of
material problems. A computer-prepared material jeopardy report is the basic
document they utilize. It gives the status of critical material not re-
ceived. In our study, we did not spend time in this area. However, our
time with the Foreman showed that too often material is a big problem and
that more might be done to improve the productive effort.
Third is the area of performance measurement. Prominently displayed
in the office of the Production Officer are graphs for each of the four
groups of their performance. The information is obtained from the MIS Per-
formance Measurement Application. The performance criteria emphasized here
is manhours allowed divided by manhours expended. From this level of manage-
ment, the emphasis against overexpending a job or KEYOP filters down tc the
Foreman--the manager responsible for daily determination of cost charging.
Although it is the expressly stated desire of top management that the Fore-
man only concern- himself with accurate charges, and that he not_ keep the
"little black book" record of his time charges, all four of the foremen we
observed did keep his own records and in some manner or other, consciously
made incorrect charges. The same was true of the foreman in the course we
attended early in the summer. Although the major performance criteria em-
phasized in daily operations and felt at the first-line level is on-time
completions, the performance measurement application, which compares KEYOP
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scheduled completions to actual completions, was not observed to be used.
This apparently was due to the emphasis on management by milestone rather
than KEY OP.
The only use of output from the Production Control Application that
we observed was in the Work Status Section which utilized the Direct Labor
Analysis Reports for updating the work load forecast and status curves.
Some of the status reports were distributed, but we did not observe their
usage. The jeopardy reports and KEYOPS scheduled to start /complete reports
were not even seen. Again, this is presumably due to emphasis on milestone
management, and the reports are based on KEYOP status.
There were two repetitive complaints in the Production Department con-
cerning MIS. The information was considered either inaccurate (see comments
above) or too late, or both. It was our impression that most people did not
really understand how to use the MIS output format even if the information
was accurate and timely.
The relative disuse of the Industrial Subsystem by the Production De-
partment at Boston was considered by the authors to be founded on two main
points. First
, the management emphasis on milestone management. As long as
milestones are met, no one cares or worries about KEYOP starts or comple-
tions. The shops are free to do their own scheduling and progressing of
work. Secondly, the perceived emphasis and preoccupation at the foreman
level on cost charging expenditures and allowances plus the reluctance to
close KEYOPS in a timely manner makes the basic progress data input of ques-
tionable reliability. In the Work Status Section, we attempted to make our
own analysis of a few cases. Our results were entirely different than those
of the section head. We took the numbers at face value: he applied
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"judgemental" corrections based on ten years of experience to correct for
the type of problems that have been discussed.
D. System Requirements
Having presented our normative and descriptive models, the next step
in our design process is determination of system requirements. Determining
the system requirements is accomplished by comparing the normative and
descriptive models. To accomplish this, we must look at the Production De-
partment as a unit to determine overall requirements.
We start with a simple restatement of the key elements of the normative
model:




1. ) Advance planning: Matches resources with work con-
tracted for; should be accomplished
by Production Officer and Repair
Officer (within the Production De-
partment )
.
2.) Static scheduling : Initial detailed scheduling of con-
tracted work ; should be accomplished
by Production Department staff.
3.) Dynamic scheduling: Accomplished when changes to static
scheduling become necessary; should
be accomplished by staff, foreman,




b. Job priori ty --establishes guidelines for job dispatching within
the shop, consistent with desires of higher manage-
ment; should be accomplished by Repair Officer and
foreman /general foreman.
c Job routing procedure—ensures proper coordination and technical
sequencing of complex tasks; should be done by
staff Planning Department.
d. Basic scheduling point- -in simple job shop ensures maximum utiliza-
tion of resources; in complex job shop environment,
must have inter-shop and intra-shop scheduling
points; inter-shop scheduling point should be Pro-
duction Department staff; intra-shop scheduling
should be foreman /general foreman.
e. Wait time—minimized by proper scheduling; accomplished by Pro-




-required for timely accomplishment of
productive work; keeps management informed of current status and al-
lows appropriate corrective action to be taken; should be carried
out by Production Department managers.
3. Performance Measurement—should be accurate measure of performance
and consistent with objectives of higher management.
4. Communication—good communications are essential to work accomplish-
ment in large, complex, long-established industry such as shipyards;
important in dealing with technical problems; brings up organization-




The descriptive observations of the managers, their decisions, and other
aspects of the Production Department which are recorded in the previous sec-
tion, enable us to make a parallel statement of the current situation- -or a
descriptive model— as follows:.
1. Job shop- -
a. Scheduling
1.) Advance planning—performed by Production Control Branch, es-
pecially the Work Status Section; Production Officer in-
volved less than expected; Work Status Section involved in
data keeping vice analysis; need for closer high level Pro-
duction Department/Planning Department coordination appears
desirable with the objective of bringing all pertinent in-
formation to light, yielding better planning.
2.) Static scheduling —performed by Scheduling Section of Pro-
duction Control Branch; effectively accomplished; highly de-
pendent on expertise of present personnel; current applica-
tion of MIS little used; static schedule rarely followed on
KEYOP level, but generally adhered to on milestone level.
3. ) Dynamic scheduling— accomplished only upon submission of re-
vision request or change of a milestone; accomplishment by
Scheduling Section; dynamic scheduling incomplete, in that
full impact on all jobs is not delineated.
b. Job priority—no formalized mechanism for establishment of priority
exists ; generally followed rule for dispatching in the shops is
earliest due date (milestone); when accomplished, it is done by
Foreman and Repair Officer.
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c Job routine procedure
-
-effectively accomplished by Planning De-
partment; specified on job order brief issued to Production De-
partment.
d. Basic scheduling point—delineation of basic scheduling point ef-
fective; on inter-shop level is done by Scheduling Section and on
intra-shop level is carried out by general foreman /foreman
.
e. Wait time- -better control procedures should help minimize present
level of wait time; Scheduling Section and foreman /general foreman
involved.
3. Performance measurement—emphasis on allowance versus expenditure
leads to inaccurate cost charging; emphasis on timely completion of
milestones exerts beneficial influence; all three levels of manage-
ment observed have an interest and are involved in proper performance
measurement
.
4. Communications—several areas in need of improvement; in particular,
communications between foreman and planners/design needs improve-
ment.











1 . Advance Planning :
Develop a computer based historical data bank for past work per-
formed. This should be organized in a manner which will enable
the Work Status Section to have easy access to the data for pur-
poses of constructing work load forecasts by ship/project and by
shop.
2 . Control, Dynamic Scheduling, Performance Criteria, and Goal
Congruence : Develop a control system which can be used for large
and complex overhauls by:
a. Establishing a method of progressing a KEYOP, job, milestone
and project which will aid the overall control process, es-
pecially for large and complex overhauls.
b. Integrating the above method into a better dynamic scheduling
scheme
.
c. Establishing a performance measurement criteria which will be
consistent with the department's objectives and which will net
motivate the foreman to make improper charges.
All three of these must be approached together to ensure that a work-
able control system will result.
3. Priority: Establish a method for setting priorities for accomplish-
ment of the productive work.
4. Communication: Improve communications and flow of information be-
tween the first-line supervisor in the Production Department and
the planners and designers in the Planning Department.
Additionally
:
5. The system developed will make maximum use of the existing sysi
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to accomplish the above goals.
6. An effort to support the decision making of each of the three
managers observed consistent with the above goals is necessary.
7. Two other areas in heed of improvement and which might be capable
of MIS support are the updating and review of methods and standards
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This effort is aimed at developing a system which will accomplish the
requirements specified in the last chapter. The overall system is first
developed and specified which addresses each of the requirements. The de-
tailed systems to support each of the three managerial levels studied are
then developed. The emphasis throughout is on defining what information is
required for support of decisions at each level and then ensuring that the
required input data is available and can be obtained in a relatively simple
manner. It is again emphasized that the overall system is incomplete be-
cause of our concentration on only three levels of management. Additional-
ly, unless stated otherwise, we are not deleting the key elements of the cur-
rent system, such as the Production Officer's Weekly Status Report, De-
linquency Reports, etc.
B. The Overall System
1. The Control System and Related Aspects
The current milestone-based system which implicitly gives major re-
s ponsibility to first-line supervisors for on-time completion was seen to
be inadequate for lengthy, complicated or unusual overhauls, but to have
posted an enviable two-and-a-half-year record based mostly on destroyer
overhauls. The scheme we propose to fill this gap in the system builds on
the milestone system and gives management the flexibility of being able to
control in more than one manner. It also takes advantage of the current MIS.
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a. Proposed Control Scheme
The current system establishes a well planned milestone
schedule for each project and designates a particular' individual (usually
a shop or group superintendent) as the responsible manager for each mile-
stone. There is no formal support provided to aid the milestone manager.
As explained earlier, he currently relies on his experience and his sub-
ordinates. Each KEYOP on the job order is tied (or keyed) to a milestone
(KEVENT on the job order). The MIS system should then be utilized to pro-
vide a KEVENT sort which lists all job orders and KEYOPS on those job orders
which are keyed to the appropriate milestone. The milestone manager could
utilize this to ensure he was familiar with all of the issued work; i.e. , as
a check list and to aid him in the progressing of that assigned work. This
idea- -formally aggregating KEYOPS to milestones--serves as the basis for the
following system.
Eor the longer, more complex overhauls, scheduling should include use
of PERT/CPM. (The yard has done this successfully in the past and intends
to do so for a forthcoming overhaul. ) The milestones should serve as the
major nodes of attention. The critical path to each milestone should be
determined as well as those paths deemed near critical. Appropriate MIS
output can be developed which will aid the milestone manager in progressing
work along those paths. The main element here is that emphasis is still on
milestone management, but that KEYOP control on the most critical paths has
become an added feature. If so desired, control by all KEYOPS keyed to the
milestone could be attempted. This is not believed to be realistic, how-
ever, because of the large number of KEYOPS, many of which are small and
have little imoact on comoletion and/or total costs. In addition to
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supporting the general control scheme, the link between milestone and KEYOP
can be exploited to aid the foreman, and this will be pursued later.
The advantages of the above scheme are:
1. It allows management (Repair Officer or Production Officer level)
to determine the method of control for a particular project, or even a por-
tion of a project.
2. The more complex projects can be controlled in a detailed manner
on the jobs/KIYOPS which are most important.
3. Only minor changes to the current MIS Industrial Subsystem would be
necessary to control at the KEYOP level on the important jobs with the focus
kept on meeting milestones. The MIS outputs which would then be of impor-
tance would be the KEYOP schedule start /complete , the KEYOP Jeopardy Re-
ports, and the status reports (for samples of the current formats see Ap-
pendix B). These formats would be oriented to the milestones.
4. The current workable system can still bo utilized where warranted.
Even in this situation, the listing of KEYOPS by milestones should be of
value at several levels of management.
b . Status Indicators
Currently, one of the major difficulties of the control system
and the information system is in determining "Where am I now?" versus "Where
should I be now?" The above scheme will aid in solving this problem by pro-
viding milestone managers better tools (the milestone-oriented MIS outputs)
and by introducing the detail necessary to prevent missing milestones.
There are several status indicators which should also be utilized by mana-
gers which are based on MIS information. All of the ones we propose are cur-
rently found in some form in the Production Control Application, Work Load
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Forecasting Application, or Performance Measurement" Application. The prob-
lems of incorrect cost charging and close out of KEYOPS which affect these
measures that were previously discussed, will be dealt with later in this
section. Sample output forms are developed later in this chapter.
We emphasize that these indicators will only aid the manager in control-
ling the productive effort; they will not control it.
The simplest status indicator is calendar days expended versus calendar
days allowed. Its significance and limitations are probably clear to the
reader who has endured this paper this far and will not be expounded upon.
The broadest, and best, overall indicator is total manhours (or mandays)
expended versus total forecast. The appropriate groupings are by total
project further divided into shops by project and by total shop. These group-
ings allow one to progress individual projects and locate shops which are in
trouble. This data is frequently most useful in graphical format on a time
plot.
There are two pertinent schedule completion indicators --the milestone
and KEYOP. At the milestone level, it is appropriate to consider milestones
late or rescheduled and the impact on project completion. At the KEYOP
level, the indicators are total KEYOPS completed versus total scheduled com-
pleted plus the number completed early and the number not completed but
scheduled complete. Even though strict adherence to KEYOP schedules may not
be required, if KEYOP closeout is done in a timely manner, these would be
good general progress indicators.
When the PERT/CPM method proposed above is utilized, the KEYOPS sched-
uled to start/complete and the KEYOP Jeopardy Report along the indicated
paths can be utilized.
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Manhours expended versus allowed by either job order or KEYOP is
another possibility. We do not recommend its use at the current time, how-
ever. This comes too close to performance measurement criteria currently
utilized which causes inaccuracies in time charging. Since control is not
exercised at those levels, they lose significance anyway.
The above will be of only limited use (as they are now) if the input
information is not accurate. Two current problems must be corrected—inac-
curate cost charging and untimely KEYOP closure.
The first step to improving the accuracy of cost charging is to elim-
inate manhours expended versus manhours allowed as a performance or status
indicator. There are four situations in which expenditures will exceed al-
lowances. First, is when the job or KEYOP is in trouble and needs extra
management and/or technical help. This indicator will detect the problem
after it occurs and therefore is not very useful for control. Other aspects
of the control system can be utilized to detect such occurrences earlier.
Second, is when there is an imbalance between work force and work is-
sued. Since each man must be charged to a job order so that he will be paid,
and since the foreman is so close to the mechanics (for many valid human be-
havioral reasons), if there is a lack of work available, the pace will slow
and the work issued will be stretched until new work is issued or the work
force is altered. Again, this criteria of expenditure versus allowance
should not be used to detect this situation. Monitoring the work load fore-
cast and work issued versus the manning levels will provide the same infor-
mation. It will also enable detection in time to take corrective act- en,
rather than after-the-fact.
Third, is when the allowance was incorrect. This does occur and is
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information that should be obtained and utilized to update standards.
Fourth, is when a foreman is not doing his job or has problems in his
work force. If he has problems, he should be telling his supervisors and
they in turn should be helping him solve them. Higher management should
not be telling him he has problems. If he is not doing his job, that can be
de_tected in other ways also. The current MIS aggregates this performance
measurement by foreman, ostensibly so he can be evaluated individually.
Since he controls the input data, however, he also can manipulate it. If he
is going to over expend 25 hours on a 100-hour job, he can charge it to a
larger job--say 500 hours--where the percentage will be unnoticed, or charge
a little to several jobs. Alternatively, he can charge correctly and turn
in a revision request to "cover himself" even though he knows it will prob-
ably be rejected. Thus, the man not doing his job can take steps to cover
up.
Only one of the above uses or situations is seen to require the use of
allowance versus expenditures, and that was for updating of standards. It
is proposed that this type of data collection be done and utilized for that
purpose. It is also proposed that the use of expenditure versus allowance
as a performance measurement be stepped. It has no useful effects, and only
serves to make the cost charging by the foreman subject to inaccuracies.
Additionally, since the foremen perceive this to be important, they waste up
to an hour each day keeping records of their charges. This is valuable time
that should be spent supervising. Direct efforts are necessary to stop this
practice. It is the most time consuming and unnecessary paperwork the fore-
man performs. Emphasis should be put on making accurate charges.
Deleting the above performance criteria and undertaking an oducaticr.;:!
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effort to get the foremen to charge correctly and forget keeping their
time records should improve the accuracy of the cost charges upon which so
much of the MIS is based. We see no meaningful drawbacks to this. Alter-
nate performance criteria are proposed later in this chapter.
The second problem to be corrected is untimely KEYOP closeout. The
foremen are reluctant to close them because they will not have a job to
charge to in the future if problems occur. Generally, a problem is likely
to be discovered during dock trials or sea trials. Therefore, many KEYOPS
stay open until the very end of the overhaul. To remedy this, two proposals
are considered.
The simplest would be to write a general KEYOP at the end of each job
order to "correct all dock trial/sea trial discrepancies." The disadvantage
would be that there would be relatively little control of what work is per-
formed against those KEYOPS. That problem already exists, however, and that
is not the one this change is attempting to correct. The other scheme would
be to establish a team of planners, designers, schedulers and shop personnel
that would issue new planning (job orders) in an expedited manner within a
reasonable time period (one to two days) after completion of trials. This
seems to be an "overkill," but for large ships might be appropriate.
Additionally, management emphasis should be placed on timely closeout.
This should be the responsibility of the group superintendents down the
civilian line organization.
As a secondary issue, we observed functions performed in the shops
which, in our judgement, should be charged to an overhead account. These in-
cluded such things as receiving and dispatching material (full time for one
man in one shop observed), and cleaning and changing chemicals in an acid
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cleaning room (about five man days). There currently are no shop overhead
accounts established for these types of functions so they are arbitrarily
charged to direct labor on job orders. We do not know how extensive this
problem is, but feel that management should study this. It appears that
the emphasis over the years to reduce overhead has caused many overhead
functions to be eliminated, but only in the accounting sense, and not in
reality. If this is so, it reduces the accuracy of work status because of
the arbitrary way such charges must be made. It also makes preparation and
review of the budget difficult. Only if real overhead functions are recog-
nized, can they adequately be controlled.
c. Dynamic Scheduling
As stated in the system requirements, there is a need for an
improved dynamic scheduling procedure. One aspect of this is closely related
to the control and progress schemes already discussed. If all managers are
better able to monitor where the overhauls are, problems will be handled
sooner and resolved before rescheduling of milestones becomes necessary.
As long as milestone management is utilized, the current methods will be
adequate when supplemented with improved status. The weekly meetings and
preparation of the status summaries serve as an adequate forum for determin-
ing problems requiring milestone changes. The Scheduling Section is then
capable of doing the rescheduling and evaluating the impact. For the more
complex overhauls, the proposed KEYOP system would require a more sensitive
system. All KEYOPS listed in jeopardy must be reviewed by the interested
managers (Repair Officer, Ship Management Officer, etc.), and determination
must- be made as to what needs to be rescheduled and what the impacts will
be on the milestones as well as other Droiects. The actual rescheduling
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will again be performed by the Scheduling Section,
d. Performance Measurement
Manhours expended versus manhours allowed has been rejected as
a proper performance measurement indicator due to the conflicts it causes
with accurate cost charging, and because most of the intelligence it pro-
vides can be obtained from other information. In its place, we propose
that on-time completion be the major measure in the Production Department.
Milestone managers need to be held responsible and accountable for milestone
completions. The KEYOP managers likewise are accountable for completion of
KEYOPS by the requisite milestone date. If control is on the KEYOPS for
designated projects, completion of the KEYOP by the KEYOP date is the appro-
priate time frame. Secondarily, overtime expenditures versus total rnanhour
expenditures will be used. This information is currently available in the
MIS and can be aggregated by either responsible foremen and /or shop.
Using completions as the measure has two main advantages. As stated
in the last chapter, the shops are already motivated toward on-time comple-
tion of the overhauls and milestones. This scheme would further emphasize
this importance. It would also provide impetus to close out KEYOPS when,
they are completed, making KEYOPS completed a better status indicator fcr
higher level management. Highlighting overtime will result in increased em-
phasis at all levels to manage within the constraints of available resources
2. Priority /Dispatching
As pointed out in the normative and descriptive models, it is to be
expected that the start/complete schedules as promulgated on the job order
will' soon after issuing become invalid and not be used in the complex job-
shop environment. The next question to address is, "If you do not use the
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schedule to accomplish the work, what do you use?" At Boston, the answer
most often found is foreman experience, based on milestone dates—an informal
closest-due-date approach. It is probably accurate and fair to say that
this approach works most of the time. However, in the large or complex over-
haul, use of this simple, informal system can lead to problems and misunder-
standings: priorities can become confused and critical jobs having down-
stream impact on overhaul completion can be delayed.
The simplest solution to this problem seems to have two parts. First,
a more formal (verbal or possibly written) delineation of priority jobs/
ships must be made from the Repair Officer /Group Superintendent level and
be reiterated and revised at a frequency to ensure emphasis and to reflect
actual conditions in the shop. It is probably best to present this informa-
tion verbally, since a ship might object to its placement on the priority
list if it were to obtain this information. A good time to present prior-
ities might be at the Production Officer's weekly status meeting where the
Production Officer, Repair Officer, Assistant Pepair Officers, and Group
Superintendents are all in attendance. It must be noted that this delinea-
tion of priority must reach down the shipyard organization to the foreman
(i.e., the dispatcher) in a timely fashion. Secondly, a more formal dis-
patching decision rule should be evaluated and then promoted, to be used
when either lesser priority jobs are involved or current priority delineation
is lacking. Adoption of these two practices should eliminate confusion in
priorities (for example, the foreman who thought that overtime on a job
meant that it had highest priority), and provide a more consistent and
sound approach to dispatching lesser jobs.
i
3. Communications
The primary communication link that must be improved is that
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between the general foreman /foreman and planning/design personnel. As dis-
cussed previously, current written procedures call for such communication,
and for the job to be done correctly and efficiently, there must be effec-
tive interaction. The planner (as well as others such as the scheduler,
etc.) must know when the scope of the job differs from that promulgated by
the job order, and the designer must know when a design deficiency exists,
such as an incorrect wiring diagram or plan. On critical jobs, corrective
action in response to problem information must be rapid, or job /overhaul
completion will slip. The current communications problem manifests itself
in several ways: (1) some planners fail to investigate the job by going down
into the ship or shop even when the situation on critical jobs warrants it
(obviously the planner need not, nor can he physically sight all jobs); (2)
some planners are unreceptive to innovative ideas of the foreman; (3) some
foremen are guilty of being unreceptive to change themselves; (4) not all
design personnel visit the ship for jobs involving installation, relocation,
and the like where interference is likely to be a problem (or if they do,
you could never tell it from the plans).
More than one possible method of improving communications comes to
mind, but the most promising one seems to be the establishing of a water-
front (i.e., near the ships and shops) planning and design coordination of-
fice, perhaps integrated with the progressmen. The advantage of this scheme
is the rapid response capability it possesses. The obvious disadvantage
is the overhead cost of these personnel. However, if the prime tasks of
these people were to troubleshoot and refer the problem to the appropriate
planner or designer, it would seem that the number of people required would
be minimal. Obviously, some sort of cost effectiveness analysis needs to be
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applied, but the results might be surprising. The authors believe that
waterfront coordinators were at one time utilized in the Boston shipyard,
but were eliminated during overhead cost reduction programs. It is our
observation that the shipyard is overly conscientious in reducing formally
recognized overhead costs, to the occasional detriment of increased direct
labor costs and perhaps overall costs. At the very least, adoption of a
waterfront coordinator for planning and design should be investigated for
large or complex overhauls and conversions.
4. Advance Planning/Work Load Forecasting
The thrust of improvement in this area must be directed toward up-
graded information quality, and mechanization of hand-recorded historical
data.
Current practices in the work load/manning level prediction area recog-
nize that accurate numbers and curves are not available; for example, the
terms "should cost" and "will cost" are in common usage. At the different
levels in the management hierarchy, a variety of correction factors are uti-
lized to get the should cost estimate; in some instances, different factors
are used for each shop! What is needed is accurate, historically-based in-
formation on which to balance work loads between the shops and, over time,
to form a vital input to work acceptance decisions, and to act as an indi-
cator of work progress.
Practically all of the historical information of past performance on
similar jobs /overhauls /conversions used by the Work Status Section is filed
manually. If this information were available in the computer data base,
many of the people in the section would be free to devote more time to analy-
sis, which is a key output of their office (it these same people are not of
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a calibre to handle analysis
, they could be replaced by persons possessing
the requisite skills). Until the shipyard's third generation computer is
operations 1, this cannot be accomplished due to equipment limitations.
A final point in the Advance Planning area that must be addressed is
the current difficulty in analyzing the impact of possible retirees. As
discussed in the descriptive model, current policy does not require that
personnel give give sufficient advance notice of retirement for proper plan-
ning to be. accomplished; this situation is made more serious in that the re-
tiree is financially induced (by the statutes governing retirement benefits)
to leave government service whenever the consumer price index passes a cer-
tain point, thus causing a step exodus of critically skilled personnel.
Despite a declaration by Production Department staff that they had been able
to very accurately predict the number of personnel leaving, we observed
more than a small amount of uncertainty and anxiety when the increase in the
CPI made retirement more attractive. It is clear that the policy should be
changed so "chat workers will be encouraged to provide adequate notice of in-
tended retirement in order that the impact of retiring personnel may be ana-
lyzed and a smoother transition effected.
5 . Methods and Standards
As pointed out in the descriptive model, work standards or allow-
ances are presently used in performance measurement, work load forecasting
and scheduling. Many of these standards are in need of either review or re-
vision. As a result of their not being up-to-date, they contribute to the
previously described cost charging practices of the foreman, to the use of
correction factors in determining "will cost" and to the general disregard
of KEYOP schedules. It is therefore clear that for accurate nerformance
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measurement (even if this is accomplished by comparing gross project allow-
ance versus expenditures), and for valid, relevant scheduling and work load
forecasting, work allowance standards must be periodically reviewed so as
to be current, obtainable and seasonably adjusted (when applicable), and





The physical plant at Boston is, in general, old and in r.eed of
modernization or sometimes extensive maintenance. From the numerous propos-
als submitted by the shops, the Shipyard Modernization end Facilities Plan-
ning Board (via a panel of the same name) approves a list that is within its
funding limit; these items are paid for by the NIF and thus ultimately fall
into overhead cost. The Shipyard Commander imposes a constraint by limiting
the amount of overhead contribution by repairs and modernization. It is
clear that a variety of evaluation techniques may be appropriate for determin-
ing relative ranking of projects, but during our short observation period, it
was not obvious which one(s) the Board and Panel used. However, it seems
evident that a cost/benefit-net present value type of analysis is not used,
and could be of value as a ranking aid, as well as assist in review of the
Board's decisions by higher management. At present, the review procedure
lacks analytical capability. The shipyard has access to a program to per-
form this analysis via a communication link to an externally located computer
facility.
C. Support for Each Manager Studied
We adopt the r.hanges proposed in the previous section and ^pply them




The major decision area in which the MIS is capable of supporting
the foreman is in his scheduling and dispatching of work to be accomplished.
It should emphasize the importance of on-time milestone completions and aid
him in accomplishing that task. In order to do this, it should summarize
all work for which he is currently responsible and which has not been com-
pleted. The use of the computer output should not cause him to perform ex-
tra paperwork, and hopefully can reduce some of the current "locally pre-
pared" records and files which are individually maintained. It should help
prevent jobs from slipping by
—
i.e., from being forgotten until a signifi-
cant problem has developed. Additionally, it should provide some material
status for material pre-crdered for a particular job. Most of all, it should
be simple and have as little volume as possible.
The output developed is shown in Figure V-l. The first major feature
is that the report is prepared for each individual foreman and lists only
milestones, job orders and KEYOPS for which he has some responsibility.
This requires a new input to MIS which will assign a responsible foreman for
each line item issued on each KEYOP and job order. (A line item is each
portion of work assigned the different shops and work centers on a KEYOP.)
This function is currently performed in a less formal manner. When job
order briefs are issued, they are screened by shop staff and/or general
foreman and are routed to the appropriate foreman for action. An example
of how this information could be input to the data base would add a step to
the existing procedure. A set of data cards which contain milestone, job
order, KEYOP, line item, shop, and work center already prepunched (this
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with the job order brief. When the briefs are distributed at the shop level
and foreman responsibility is assigned, the cards could be marked with the
name (or a number code) of the foreman assigned. These would then be re-
turned to data processing for punching (same system as tine cards) and entry
into the data files.
The output would appear so that the projects would be listed in order
of completion dates with the earliest date first. All uncompleted mile-
stones for that project are listed by the same date sequence. Each job or-
der and KEYOP on the job order for which the foreman has responsibility is
listed, again in order of earliest completion dates. Each KEYOP is sup-
ported by a listing of scheduled start and completion dates, manhours is-
sued, and which shop is the key shop. Additionally, they are coded to de-
termine if there are KEYOPS which are on a project controlled at the KEYOP
or milestone level. The material status will remain blank unless there is
a known problem which is listed on one of the material jeopardy reports
which are part of the MIS. In that ca;=e
,
the report number is listed with
the report date to enable the foreman to contact the shop planner and get
more details if necessary. A blank does not necessarily mean that material
is not a problem. At present, shop stores items are not pre-ordered and
some DMI material is ordered prior to the issue of the job order. In those
cases , a material problem could exist and not be capable of being tied
through the MIS or the supply system to a specific job order or KEYOP. Ef-
forts are being taken to remedy this problem.
Deliberately omitted was a space for manhours expended against each
KEYOP. This was done to de-emphasize the current foreman preoccupation
with this and because it does not urovide him with anv significant
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information. A foreman that needs to look at an expenditure versus allow-
ance to tell him the status of his jobs should not be a foreman. He should
know the status from personal observation and supervision.
Using figures available for an outside foreman who had a work force
which was twice the normal or average size, the report should be no longer
than eight pages. An outside foreman is typically assigned to a specific
project. The foreman observed had responsibility for approximately 50 job
orders which, at most, would be about 200 KEYOPS. There are 25 information-
al lines per page in the current MIS output and this therefore would pro-
duce an eight-page output. Although these figures are rough, they serve to
give an indication of what is likely the largest output to be expected.
The output developed accomplishes the following:
1. It emphasizes on-time completion at the appropriate level (KEYOP
or milestone)
.
2. It provides a checklist for the foreman to insure he has received
applicable job order briefs and to establish work schedules and manning
assignments
.
3. It gives him some advance notice of possible material problems.
4. It eliminates some of the current records or work summaries he
presently keeps.
5. It is simple with ample room for him to mark up and utilize as a
working piece of paper.
2. The Repair Officer
As a result of the modeling process and delineation of system re-
quirements, it was apparent that the major decision areas in which the
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Repair Officer is involved are overhaul co-.itrol/strategy and human resource
managemen t , both of which are closely related. It was also seen that the
types of information most in need of improvement were job status and work
load forecasting.
In the area of control, we have developed two new computer-generated
reports. The first is a ship milestone schedule (see Figure V-2) which
would replace the current manually-generated one. The significant advan-
tages of this proposed report are the listing of the responsible milestone
manager, the associated job orders, and the respective responsible lead
shop. This provides the Repair Officer with: (1) a broadly -based schedule/
progress indicator, i.e., the milestone schedule: (2) a reminder of the sig-
nificant job orders associated with each milestone to help prevent items
from "falling through the cracks," and (3) a clear indication of the re-
sponsible subproject manager in case problems develop. (A related sugges-
tion, but not in the problem area we defined, is that a listing of KEYOPS
associated with each milestone be provided to the milestone manager and/or
progressman. ) This report should be issued at the start of an overhaul,
and when changes /additions occur, but not more often than weekly to prevent
unnecessary paper generation.
The second report is a weekly summary of project status indicators to
be used in evaluation of ship overhaul progress and as an aid in problem
finding. As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, there is no
one clear indication of project status, so we have arrayed the possible
best numerical indicators of progress on a single sheet in a manner suited
for comparison and analysis. It must be understood that once a potential




















































































































other informational sources. One of these will be the more detailed infor-
mation currently available in other MIS reports. Similarly, not all of the
valuable progress indicators are presented; for example, the written state-
ment of forthcoming milestones, controlling jobs, and potential downstream
trouble areas contained in the Production Officer's Weekly Summary Sheets
is excellent and :i s not intended to be replaced by this array of numerical
indicators. This report is shown in Figure V-3.
Two reports were developed in the area of human resources management.
The first, the Shop Status Report (Figure V-4) contains no information not
already found on standard shipyard MIS reports, but presents information
solely relevant to analysis of a shop's current work load vice its capability
to accomplish it. The available force capability is compared both to work
issued and to the work load forecasted. It will also aid in making decisions
on overtime and whether to let work be subcontracted to outside contractors.
It is to be noted that the Repair Officer's time horizon for workload fore-
cast information is shorter than that of the Production Officer.
The second report is the Overtime Status Report and essentially mecha-
nizes information currently hand prepared. As discussed previously, the
shipyard operates under an overtime quota or target system, and performance
against targeted overtime must be monitored. Additionally, the next week's
overtime requested from the shops can be comp-ired to that forecasted as
necessary by the Work Status Section to meet job/overhaul completions on
time. This information is further broken down to the shop level to aid anal-
ysis. This report would be issued weekly and cover the current calendar'
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3. The Production Office r
The support developed for the Repair Officer is applicable for use
by the Production Officer. Since his perspective is more global and since
he is less involved in the day-to-day problems, they will be useful mostly
for informational purposes to keep him aware of the current status rather
than for problem finding and problem solving.
Two reports have been developed for use by the Production Officer in
monitoring and evaluating personnel and shop performance. The Performance
Measurement Summary Report shown in Figure V-6 lists each group superintend-
ent and the shops in his group. Performance by number of milestones spe-
cifically assigned to each supervisor (all listed by organizational code
rather than name) and completed on time is measured for each appropriate
manager as well as group totals. The percentage of the total hours that
were spent on overtime is also tabulated for each group and shop. This ag-
gregation will allow the Production Officer to view overall performance of
the line portion of his department. The report should be issued quarterly.
The summary report does not enable any analysis of what milestones
were late or why. The Performance Measurement Report shown in Figure V-7
provides some information which can be of use for that purpose. It lists
by group and shop superintendents each milestone assigned and the completion
performance on each. The present overtime is tabulated for each milestone.
A "remarks" column is provided to attempt to give additional information re-
garding causes of milestone rescheduling. This report can be used to look
at detailed group/shop performance.
This shift to on-time completion as the measure of performance should
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juggling expenditures to "look good" and can concentrate on doing the job.
If the Production Officer and his staff and the Planning Department properly
balance the work load and the work force
, the expenditures will take care of
themselves. If a problem is seen to be developing, the line managers will
be motivated more to solve it dnd to get the job done on time. Additional-
ly, it will cause milestone managers to play a more active role in inter-
shop and inter-group coordination since they will realize that they wil]
be accountable for the milestone.
The inclusion of percentage of overtime expenditures provided impetus
for the manager to manage within his normal manpower resources. Since timely
completion is also stressed the manager cannot act to just ignore overtime.
If overtime usage is necessary for completion, he will either ask for it and
be on time, or not ask and be late. It will be the responsibility of the
Repair Officer and Production Officer to ensure that these performance cri-
teria are properly utilized to direct the Production Department manager's
efforts. Inclusion of the overtime emphasizes that it is also important to
do the job in an efficient manner--not only to get it done on time.
These reports will aid the aid the Production Officer in objectively
making annual performance evaluations of his key managers. They will also
aid in finding shops or skills which may be the source of recurring problems
and which need special management attention.
Most of the data on these reports is already in the MIS data bank. As-
signment of milestones (KEVENT) to a particular manager and the determina-
tion of the appropriate "remarks" entry should be the responsibility of the




Th,- other areas of interest to the Production Officer do not appear'
us as being capable of direct MIS support. Much can probably be done in
the areas of work load forecast (which was discussed earlier), facilities
improvement, budget, etc., to aid and support his staff personnel. In some
cases, they already are supported by the MIS. We were not able to delve
into each of these areas in sufficient detail to make specific recommenda-
tions. Given time, we feel that we would be able to do that with the ap-
proach we have utilized.
In these areas
,
the kind of system which the Production Officer could
directly use would be one which would enable him to directly interact with
the computer and change parameters and get quick output--!. e. , to play a
"What if?" game. It is unlikely that he would do this with a batch proces-
sing system because of the preparation time and the time lag involved. An
on-line, real-time system with a terminal easily accessible could overcome
these problems. When such a system becomes a real possibility, we feel






The task of designing a model-based, decision-oriented MIS is not a
simple one, and the project was indeed a learning process. Additionally,
the model-based, decision-oriented method is still a relatively new concept,
and before this paper was begun, it was not clear that this approach was
practical in the shipyard environment. This chapter is a summary of our
evaluation of: (1) the validity of the method, (2) what we have accom-
plished, and (3) recommended future work. Since we have had no previous
system design experience, these comments will not be of a comparative nature,
but instead will be directed toward an assessment of the success of the
method and the project.
Validity of the Method
The model-based portion of the approach proved to be a particularly
useful tool. Construction of a significant portion of the normative model
before the descriptive work was started had the effect of forcing us to be-
come generally familiar with the problem early in the process. Similarly,
this sequential process helped avert the danger of construction of an MIS
based only on the current system. Comparison of the normative and descrip-
tive models highlighted current system deficiencies such as KEYOP versus
milestone management, and cost charging practices. Formulation of the final
portion of the normative model after the descriptive model was started en-
sured that the former was feasible and not overly idealistic. Thus, the
model-based approach provided an efficient means of defining the existing
problem, and it a.lso stimulated the design process by providing ideas for
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solution of those problems.
In general, we felt that the decision orientation of the approach was
appropriate for the task of improving or redesigning an already existing
system. Since we did not attack the problem of original design of an MIS
where no formal system existed, we cannot positively comment on its feasi-
bility in this area, but assume that such an approach would be beneficial.
It has been suggested to the authors that perhaps what we should have
focused on were specific decisions vice decision areas; i.e., develop a sys-
tem to support specific decisions. In the shipyard environment, we feel
that such an approach would be too idealistic. It was our experience that
for (1) the same manager making different but related decisions, and (2)
different levels of managers making similar decisions, there was signifi-
cant overlap in the areas of both the type of information utilized and the
sources of the information. In situations where this is the case, it appears
to be clear that grouping decisions into categories (decision areas) avoids
costly and unnecessary complexity. At the foreman level, the variation in
the type of work between shops and between work centers within the same shop
would require that a tailor-made system be developed for each. Additionally,
individual styles of management would require a change in the system each
time there were personnel changes. At the higher levels of Repair Officer
and Production Officer, there are a wide variety of decisions. Additional-
ly, the information required for decisions of a similar nature but made at
different points in time was significantly different during the brief period
we had to make observations. The time and cost involved in developing and
maintaining such a system seems to be prohibitive. In an academic sense,
such a system would certainly be desirable. In a practical sense, we feel
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it would be impossible to attain.
A deci si on -oriented approach combined with the model-based method
provides the analyst with a framework that is sensitive to the prime func-
tion of management—decision making. That simple fact helps bridge any com-
munication gap between the analyst and the manager he is trying to support.
The managers we worked with were very willing to talk about the decisions
they made and how they made them--specifically , what information they uti-
lized and from where and how they obtained it. (An important note: we
felt it necessary to actually observe the manager in the process of making
the decision and to get his ideas at that time. We feel that an interview
or diary approach would not be very useful.
)
Assessment of th e Project
An objective assessment of one's own work is always a difficult assign-
ment, but one that frequently provides significant benefits. The best way
to accomplish this probably lies in trying to answer the question, "Bid T
do what I set out to do?"
The intent of cur task was to design an MIS to support three levels of
management in the Production Department of the Boston Naval Shipyard. This
we feel we have done. Our finished product constitutes a significant im-
provement over the previous system, but keeps unchanged those portions which
had merit. As the reader will recall, the present MIS is little used by
the Production Department, largely due to inaccurate or untimely informa-
tion caused by improper cost charging and closeou* procedures, and dif-
ferences caused by management by milestones vice KEYOPS (the basis for the
current MIS). We have identified the problem areas, recommended corrective
action, and proposed a small number of reports that should be useful tc
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managers in Ihe department.
Was our contention that the model-based, decision-oriented approach
lead to large vice incremental changes true? We feel that although the
number of reports that have been changed is small, the supporting structure
for them has been significantly changed, thereby rendering previously use-
less reports useful. The establishment of priorities, implementation of
proper cost charging procedures and adherence to a modified milestone/
KEYOP system are large and basic changes which, if implemented, should go
a long way toward making the system usable and effective. We are not sure
that these same results could not have been derived by methods other than
the one we employed-, but regardless, we doubt that others would have done
so in as efficient a manner.
In a non-academic sense, the project was immensely successful in two
areas; first, it provided us with a "hands-on" experience in the system de-
sign area, and secondly, provided an opportunity to view a naval shipyard
(our future area of employment) from a vantage point that few naval officers
can enjoy. Formal instruction, case studies, and term projects certainly go
a long way toward providing the student with a background in information
system design, but such an education is not complete without an extensive
field experience such as this. While in the shipyard, we were free to in-
vestigate what we chose, relatively immune to the daily pressures and biases
which beset one permanently employed in the yard, and we were able to view
the operations and inner mechanisms of the shipyard in a close to objective
manner.
Recommendations
The following are our recommendations for future work that can expand
the knowledge of MIS design:
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1. Do a study to determine the feasibility of developing a system
based on detailed analysis of specific decisions made at each management
level. If the study indicates that there is some level of feasibility,
utilize that approach in a real situation and evaluate the effort.
2. Study other case situations (i.e., other than the job shop) to
see whether the model-based approach can be utilized and therefore developed
as a generalized approach to MIS design.
3. Investigate the differences, similarities, and overlap between the
deci si on -oriented and functional-oriented approaches discussed in Chapter
II and illustrated in Figure II-2.
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START AVAILABILrrr . 11-01-2
Off LOAD Oil 11-03-2
ACCESS COMPLETE 11-03-2
CABLE DRUMS REMOVAL COMPLETE 11-06-2
SSTG AND SWITCHBOARD REMOVALS COMPLETE 11-08-2
BOILER INSPECTION REPORTS COMPLETE- —— 11-14-2
BOW SHEAVE REMOVAL COMPLETE 11-15-2





CABLE DRUM FOUNDATION SHIMMING COMPLETE —- 11-20-2
PLANNING CUT OJT (NEW WORK)—— — 11-22-2
SSTG GENERATORS AND SWTTCHBDS LANDED ON BOARD 11-27-2
CABLE DRUMS & BEARING SHOP REPAIRS COMPLETE 11-28-2
DOCK— 11-29-2
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT REPAIRS COMPLETE 12-01-2
INDOCK INSPECTION REPORTS COMPLETE 12-07-2
INSTALL CABLE DRUMS——— 12-08-2
DRAW Orr/HOLD BACK MACH OVHL COMPLETE 12-08-2
INSTALL CABLE DRUM SPEED REDUCER 12-15-2
CABLE DRUMS COMPLETE TOPSIDE 12-15-2
BOW SHEAVES SHOP REPAIRS COMFLETE 01-02-3
DRAW OPT/HOLD BACK INSTALLATION COMPLETE 01-05-3
SSTG GENERATOR INSTALLATION COMPLETE- 01-08-3
UNDOCK -- 01-11-3
CABLE HAULERS SHOP REPAIR'S COMPLETE 01-12-3
SWITCHBOARD INSTALLATION COMPLETE 01-12-3




























PREPARED BT: H. SHULMAN
SSTG GENERATOR FLUSHING COMFLETE- . - 01-15-3
LIGHT OFF—— ———>. 01-16-3
START MACHINERY TEST——— , - — - 01-17-3
START SSTG GENERATOR TESTS-—— - 01-18-3
BOW SHEAVES COVERS AND A FRAME COMPLETE —
—
01-26*3
CABLE GEN ADJUST COMPLETE PWR AVAIL—— 01-26-3
COMPLETE ELECTRICAL, PNEUMATIC, AND HYDRAULIC
CHECK OUT CV CABLE MACHINERY SYSTEM 01-26-3
CABLE HAULERS REINSTALLED COMPLETE-————- 01-26-3
TEST ROOM COMPLETE—————— — 01-26-3
BUOY SKID TEST COMPLETE...——— ——— 01-26-3
START CABLE MACHINERY TESTING—-— — 01-29-3
SSTG GENERATOR TESTS COMPLETE—————— 01-31-3
DOCK TRIAL—————————— 02-01-3
MACHINERY SEA TRIAL————— — 02-08-3
START CABLE MACHINERY ROUND ROBIN-— — 02-12-3
WATERFRONT COMPLETION—————— 02-23-3












Sub v : Weekly Surreary o^ Production Status
1. ThiB sumcsary contains comments on progress of controlling joos and major
proolGB areat..
2. Chip status reports are groupea in accordance with Type Liesi; assignment.
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